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INTRODUCTION 
120 years ago, in May 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that "the power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of 
sovereignty ... cannot be granted away or restrained. "1 Sixty 
years later, in January 1950, at the height of the Cold War, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine by 
holding that "it is not within the province of any court, unless 
expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the 
political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien."2 
Another sixty years have passed and more recently, in February 
2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that "a 
nation-state has the inherent right to exclude or admit foreigners 
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1. See Chae Chan Ping (The Chinese Exclusion Case). 130 U.S. 581. 609 (1889). 
2 See Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 U.S. 537.542--43 (1950). 
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and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions for their 
exclusion and admission. "3 The principle to decide "which alien 
may, and which alien may not, enter the United States, and on 
what terms," Judge Randolph firmly asserted, ''has been a 
matter of political determination by each state-a matter wholly 
outside the concern and competence of the judiciary."~ 
In principle, the political branches continue to enjoy plenary 
power to decide who may enter and who may stay. But this is not 
the full picture. One should not think that nothing has changed 
since the nineteenth century, and that the political branches are 
given carte blanche to decide the rules of the immigration issue. 
As a matter of fact (and law), a lot has been changed since-in 
the United States and elsewhere. In the most detailed book on 
ethnic selectivity in immigration law, Christian Joppke shows 
how liberal democracies have generally abandoned ethnic 
selection and moved in a more liberal course.; Changes in 
domestic law and international human rights law have restrained 
states' power to regulate the terms for immigration selection. 
States can still control immigration, but they are more limited by 
some base-level standards of permissible and impermissible 
criteria. Determining the limits of what is permissible, and 
discussing whether permissible criteria include decisions made 
on the basis of race, religion and nationality, is the focus of this 
Article. 
The topic of permissible and impermissible immigration 
criteria is a neglected field in constitutional law and political 
theory. There is little literature on the ethics of criteria for 
exclusion and inclusion of immigrants. It is also rare to find a 
detailed account on the ethics of permissible and impermissible 
criteria in other fields, such as security policies. Back in 1997, 
Vice President Al Gore's Report on Aviation Safety and Security 
noted that it is permissible to develop and implement profiling 
systems in aviation procedures for questioning and searching 
passengers- as long as the profile is not based on "national 
origin, racial, ethnic, religious or gender characteristics" of 
citizens.6 In Canada, a Governmental Commission concluded 
3. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022. 1025. (D.C. Cir. 2009). cere. granted. 130 
S. Ct. 458 (2009). 
4. !d. at 1026. 
5. See generally CHRISTIAN JOPPKE. SELECfl!'iG BY ORIGIN: ETHNIC MIG RATIO:" 
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (2005). 
6. See WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY: FINAL 
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that national security investigations can be based upon country 
of origin, but "must not be based on racial, religious or ethnic 
profiling."7 In Europe, the Council of the European Union 
recommended that Member States develop and use terrorist 
profiles in combating terrorism- with special attention given to 
their use in immigration context. Factors of terrorist profiles may 
include nationality, place of birth, age, gender, and physical 
distinguishing features but must exclude race, ethnicity, and 
religion.R Why are these criteria impermissible, while others are 
permissible? What are the factors that make the difference? 
Little literature exists on the theory and typology of immigration 
criteria. This Article is intended to fill the gap. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers an innovative 
approach to tackle the issue of immigration restrictions. It 
challenges the traditional concept in the literature under which 
criteria and justifications for controlling immigration are tied 
together. According to the conventional view, there are some 
permissible and impermissible justifications to limit immigration 
and, accordingly, some permissible and impermissible criteria. 
Thus, if one believes that preserving the national culture is a 
legitimate justification to restrict immigration, one usually 
concludes that it is also legitimate to use culture as a criterion for 
immigration selection. On the other hand, if one believes that 
cultural continuity is an unjustifiable purpose in restricting 
immigration, one usually concludes that immigrants' cultural 
backgrounds should be excluded from the process of 
immigration selection. Part I departs from this view by 
distinguishing between criteria and justifications. It calls for a 
two-stage process of immigration selection under which states 
will be required to present a legitimate justification to restrict 
immigration and, in addition, a legitimate criterion serving this 
justification. In other words: in order to restrict immigration, 
states will need to justify both the justifications and the criteria 
used. 9 The Article focuses on the second stage. It asks whether 
REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLIKTON (Feb. 12. 1997). 
7. See COM\1ISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN 
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR. REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: 
ANALYSIS AKD RECOMMEKDATIONS (Sept. 18. 2006). 
8. See Draft Council Recommendation on the Development of Terrorist Profiles. 
Council of the European Union (Nov. 28. 2002). 
9. The terms qualifications. criteria. grounds. terms and conditions are used here 
interchangeably. We also use interchangeably the terms permissible or impermissible and 
legitimate or illegitimate criteria. though they are not always the same (permissible 
240 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:237 
race. religion and nationality could ever be legitimate 
immigration criteria when they serve a legitimate purpose. 
Part II is descriptive: It presents current immigration laws in 
the United States. In a pre-9/11 world. many scholars believed 
that race-based immigration law was withering away.w Part II 
shows that these forecasts were premature. Racial classifications 
continue to shape the process of immigration selection. Part II 
also distinguishes between different criteria used to select 
immigrants: race. ethnicity. religion, and nationality. These are 
different criteria that require a different analysis. Part II 
demonstrates how official and central race-based classifications 
remain to date. While there is a general process of 
liberalization- racial classifications have become less direct and 
arbitrary, positive rather than negative. nationality-based more 
than race-based- it was too early to celebrate their 
disappearance. Race-based criteria remain formal, group-based 
in nature. and apply to admission and naturalization. This reality 
has been strengthened by three reasons: the "War on Terror" 
and post-9111 security concerns, ongoing cultural clashes 
between native and immigrant groups, and a process of re-
ethnicization under which nation-states grant privileges to ethnic 
diaspora in admission and eligibility to citizenship. 
Part III is normative: It asks whether the use of race, 
ethnicity, religion and nationality in immigrant selection can be 
legally permitted. The conventional view is that race, ethnicity 
and religion (as opposed to nationality) are impermissible 
criteria. Under this dichotomous view. there are clearly 
permissible and clearly impermissible immigration criteria.11 Part 
III challenges this view by considering three normative 
disciplines to analyze race-based immigration classifications: 
constitutional law, international human rights law and moral 
philosophy. It shows that under each discipline, the use of race. 
ethnicity, religion and nationality could (and sometimes should) 
matter in the process of immigrant selection. This might not be 
desirable or a wise policy. but it still permits a narrow road to 
criteria are not necessarily legitimate). 
10. See. e.g .. Gabriel J. Chin. Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine:? A Tentative 
Apologv and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constiwtional Immigration 
Law, 14 GEO. IM:\1IG. L.J. 257 (2000). 
11. See, e.g .. Joseph H. Carens. Who Should Get In?: The Ethics of Immigration 
Admissions. 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (2003) (arguing that race. religion and ethnicity 
are always illegitimate immigration criteria). 
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use race as a criterion in immigration policy. Part III also 
sketches the considerations required to withstand the legal 
conditions for such race-based use. In a nutshell, from a 
constitutional perspective, race can be a permissible criterion 
under the Fourteenth Amendment when it is based on reliable 
statistical evidence and as long as race is not the exclusive factor, 
whether the policy is racially motivated or not. The Fourteenth 
Amendment takes account of racial prejudice yet does not 
require satisfying strict scrutiny because immigration is usually 
seen as extraconstitutional area. From an international human 
rights law perspective. the prohibitions against racial 
discrimination have broad exemptions in the field of 
immigration. In principle. race can matter when its use is not 
arbitrary, serves a legitimate purpose and is proportional. From 
a moral perspective based on the principle of corrective justice, 
race can matter when it is aimed at correcting past wrongs, a 
kind of reparation for past exploitation. From a perspective of 
distributive justice, race can matter when it is intended at 
allocation of goods. In these situations, race-based classifications 
have different justifications, goals and scope, nonetheless they 
are not excluded per se; they are context-based. 
Part IV focuses on one common justification invoked by 
some advocates of immigration restrictions-protecting national 
security. In a post 9111 world, the use of race, religion and 
nationality in immigrant selection has increased. In the public 
debate, a common locution was the "yes, but" argument, that is, 
racial selection may be forbidden BUT the War on Terror is a 
different context. Under this view, avoiding enhanced scrutiny of 
Muslims would be "an invitation to further terror. " 12 Part IV 
tackles the contention on the effectiveness of racial immigration 
criteria as a counterterrorism measure. It casts doubts on three 
issues: First, on the statistical level, the use of racial 
classifications often lacks statistical correlation. Second, on the 
effectiveness leveL such use has not yet proved as cost-effective. 
Third, on the psychological level. there is an unconscious human 
tendency to use racial criteria more than their actual predictor 
contribution justifies. The "'most-likely-strategy" is sometimes a 
cognitive bias and a psychological (and statistical) error. Hence, 
12. See Daniel Pipes. The Enemy Within. N.Y. POST. Jan. 24. 2003; Paul Sperry. 
When the Profile Fits the Crime. N.Y. TI'v!ES. July 28. 2005. 
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it is necessary to consider some alternatives for immigration 
selection. 
Part V develops a typology of immigrant selection. It 
employs two tests-the policy's motivation and the policy's 
effect- to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cases: 
using racial criteria to achieve either a racial purpose or a non-
racial purpose, and using facially-neutral criteria to achieve 
either a racial purpose or a non-racial purpose. Part V then 
presents four alternative methods of immigrant selection. The 
first is universal selection. This method focuses on non-racial 
immigration criteria. These can be ascribed characteristics, such 
as one's gender, or achieved characteristics, such as one's 
education or skills. The second is positive selection. This method 
does not target unwanted immigrants but instead is designed to 
identify preferred immigrants. While universal selection is 
premised on non-racial criteria, positive selection permits the 
use of race as one of the preferred criteria. The third is random 
selection. This method calls for lottery distribution of visas. 
Immigrants are selected by casting lots. The fourth is racial 
selection with just compensation. This method permits the use of 
race so long as it is accompanied by just compensation for the 
discriminatory effect. Part V shows how none of these methods 
has taken away the controversy about race, and how even 
facially-neutral methods, such as random or universal selection, 
are rooted in race. As the immigration debate in the country 
continues to percolate, the issue of immigrant selection has both 
theoretical and practical significance. 
I. CRITERIA AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls argued for a "qualified 
right to limit immigration."13 The challenge is to grasp what the 
legitimate qualifications are. The starting point of this Article is 
thus the premise that a sovereign state has a qualified right to 
limit immigration and thereby set some criteria for exclusion and 
inclusion. It is possible to challenge this premise, as some 
scholars have done,14 but the still widely accepted proposition in 
13. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 39 (1999). 
14. See. e.g .. Joseph H. Carens. Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian 
Perspective. in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL 
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25 (Brian Barry & Robert Goodin eds .. 1992): 
Jonathan Seglow. The Ethics of Immigration, 3 POL. STUD. REV. 317 (2005). 
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international human rights law is that states can generally decide 
the qualifications for admission and naturalization. 
Many scholars have enriched the discussion on justifications 
to limit immigration. Henry Sidgwick notes that states can 
restrict immigration to protect "the internal cohesion of a 
nation" and to "maintain an adequately high quality of civilized 
life. "1' Joseph Carens supports states' right to restrict 
immigration based on a threat to the public order, national 
security, liberal democratic values and economic well-being.16 In 
The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, James Hudson analyzes 
five common justifications to restrict immigration-protecting 
the wages of the native workers, protecting the ethnic and 
cultural makeup of the society, avoiding unwanted burden on 
the native population (air pollution, welfare burden, etc.), 
preventing criminal activity and harm to national security 
interests, and maintaining a dominant, privileged position.17 In 
Immigration: The Case for Limits, David Miller presents two 
justifications for limiting immigration-cultural continuity and 
population control. 1H In a later essay, Miller makes a case for 
other justifications, such as protecting principles of political 
liberalism. 19 In a recent article, Stephen Macedo describes 
several justifications used by liberal democracies to restrict 
immigration, such as protecting the social solidarity and 
supporting social justice at home.20 But whether one finds the 
justification in a liberal theory21 or a communitarian theory,22 the 
15. See HENRY SIDGWICK. THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 309 (4th ed .• 1919). 
16. See Joseph H. Carens. Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in 
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 229. 237-41 (Ronald S. Beiner ed., 2007). Carens actually 
makes a case for open borders yet accepts some narrow liberal justifications for limiting 
immigration. 
17. See James L. Hudson. The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, 10 Soc. THEORY 
& PRAC. 201 (1984). 
18. See David Miller. Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 193 (Andrew Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman eds., 
2005). 
19. See David Miller. Immif?rants, Nations, and Citizenship. 6 J. POL. PHIL. 371 
(2008). 
20. See Stephen Macedo. When and Whv Should Liberal Democracies Restrict 
!tnmif?ration 7 . in CITIZENSHIP. BORDERS. AND-HUMAN NEEDS (Rogers M. Smith ed., 
2010). 
21. See WILL KYMLICKA. LIBERALISM. COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); 
Carens. supra note 14: Macedo. supra note 20: A vishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, 
Liberalism and the Right to Culture. 61 Soc. RES. 491 (1994). 
22. See MICHAEL WALZER. SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQL:ALITY (1983): Miller. supra notes 18 and 19. 
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literature on the justifications to restrict immigration is vast and 
well-established. 
The discussion about legitimate and illegitimate 
justifications to limit migration- whatever these justifications 
are-says little about legitimate and illegitimate criteria. One 
could argue that a state is justified in limiting immigration for 
the purpose of preserving the cultural composition of the 
society. This justification, however, does not necessarily mean 
inclusion or exclusion of immigrants who share similar cultural 
characteristics. On the one hand. giving preferences to 
educated and skills-based immigrants over family-based 
immigrants might reduce the number of Latino immigrants and 
increase the number of Western European immigrants. Under 
this view, a points-based immigration system. similar to those 
used in Britain and Canada, might have cultural implications 
on the composition of qualified immigrants. In this case, the 
state uses non-cultural criteria to achieve a cultural purpose. 
On the other hand, states can use culture-based criteria to 
achieve a non-cultural purpose. One purpose can be national 
security: in this context, culture is a pretext for keeping out 
certain kinds of immigrants who might be regarded as security 
risks, or even as potential terrorists. A second purpose can be 
related to the population size, that is, culture is a criterion in 
the general enterprise to restrict immigration. Under that 
explanation, states do not want immigration on a broad scale, 
irrespective of its composition, and culture is just another 
means to reduce the number. A third purpose can be protecting 
the welfare system, that is, culture is used to keep out 
immigrants who might become a financial burden. The 
assumption here is that there is a link between culture and the 
chances of participation in the job market. A fourth purpose 
can be promoting the social cohesion, that is, culture is used 
based upon the premise under which a cultural homogeneous 
society is more stable. The assumption here is that a society 
that is too diverse may lose its solidarity and, as a result, may 
even cease to exist as a sovereign state. 
Criteria and justifications for immigrant selection do not 
live in a different planet; they are related. An illegitimate 
justification may annul the validation of the criterion used; if the 
end is illegitimate, the means may be invalidated too. Yet a 
legitimate end is only the first step. It has to be followed by a 
second step, which is the need to justify the criterion used. To 
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return to Miller's claim about cultural continuity, even if there 
are legitimate reasons for such an end, one still has to deal with 
the question of the criteria used to achieve cultural preservation. 
Miller himself supports broad grounds for immigrant selection. 
Under his view, "given that states are entitled to put a ceiling on 
the numbers of people they take it in ... they need to select 
somehow. if only by lottery."" But what does "somehow" mean? 
Miller mentions different criteria: speaking the native language, 
cultural perceptions of the applicant and, in rare cases, 
religion- "religion could be a relevant criterion only where it 
continues to form an essential part of the public culture. as in the 
case of the state of Israel. "24 This connection, however, is far 
from being simple. Even if states have a right to restrict 
immigration, and even if this right includes cultural continuity as 
a legitimate end. it does not follow that states can pick and 
choose whatever criteria they want. 
In the next sections, we discuss the criteria of race, ethnicity, 
religion and nationality. We first describe their different uses in 
immigrant selection and then discuss related legal issues. It is 
important to keep in mind the following distinctions: First, 
criteria for exclusion are generally not identical with criteria for 
inclusion. Exclusion criteria set grounds for inadmissibility; for 
example, under the category of security-related issues, different 
exclusionary criteria exist, such as terrorist activities, 
participation in a Nazi-based persecution and membership in a 
totalitarian party.2' Inclusion criteria set grounds for prioritizing 
certain aliens in immigration; examples are the use of education, 
economic characteristics and family ties. Joppke attractively 
catches this as a distinction between negative and positive 
immigration selection.2" Second, some criteria are individual-
based while others are group-based. Individualistic criteria focus 
on characteristics of individuals- whether or not they 
individually present a security risk, vulnerability to becoming a 
23. See Miller. supra note 18. at 204. 
24. !d. 
25. See 8 U.S.C. * 1182 (2008). 
26. See JOPPKE. supra note 5. at 22-23. 220-24. Joppke rightly mentions that 
although positive and negative selectivity '"are evidently made from starkly different 
moral cloth··. this distinction ··is not as clean and clear as it seems··. Preferring A means 
discriminating against B- '"the reverse side of prioritizing some is discriminating against 
all others ... Joppke. however. refers to group selectivity. He gives Asians exclusion from 
the United States and German and Israel's Laws of Return as examples of negative and 
positive selectivity. 
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public charge, or suffering from physical or mental disorder. 
Group-based criteria treat individuals as part of collective 
groups; examples include policies that exclude Asians. or include 
ethnic Jews and Germans."7 Third, in principle. different criteria 
exist for admission into the country and for admission into the 
citizenry. Criteria such as national security, public order and 
public health exist as part of the admission process, while other 
criteria-such as language proficiency, civic knowledge, and 
attachments to the Constitution-exist as part of the 
naturalization process.28 These distinctions are often blurred. For 
instance, in some countries, a language requirement exists not 
only for naturalization but also for admission. Fourth, different 
criteria generally apply differently to different types of 
immigrants. Criteria for admitting family members are not 
identical with those applied to asylum seekers. economic 
migrants and seasonal workers. And last, immigration criteria 
can be observed directly from law reports, and indirectly by 
looking at impacts and effects. Thus, a facially-neutral criterion 
may hide, intentionally or accidentally, a suspect criterion. 
A note on terminology: the term "immigration selection .. 
refers in this Article to three fields: selecting people in entering a 
country (admission), joining a political community 
(naturalization), and deportation (removal). The Article leaves 
out other immigration issues, such as denaturalization or 
granting rights to immigrants. A difficult issue is defining race 
and ethnicity. There are many ways to define race and 
ethnicity -sociological, ethnological, geographical. historical. or 
a combination of these-while each definition may have 
different components, require a different discussion and lead to 
a different conclusion. We do not pretend to solve this puzzle 
here by suggesting a legal definition. "y Instead, we use race and 
27. One could claim that even individualistic criteria are based on collective 
presumptions. See Liav Orgad. Love and War: Family Migration in Time of National 
Emergency. 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85. 108--12 (2008). 
28. For admission and naturalization criteria in 27 European countries. see 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAWS IN THE 27 EU MEMBER STATES FOR LEGAL 
IMMIGRATION 473-93 (2008). For admission and naturalization criteria in the United 
States. see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGGEZ. IMMIGRATION A!'iD 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 250--354. 420--62. 1305-DS (5th ed .. 2009): THOMAS A. 
ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN. HIROSHI MOTOML'RA & MARYELLE!'i FULLERTO:--;. 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 63-82. 297-307. 507-77 (6th ed. 
2008). 
29. For a discussion of legal definitions of race. ethnicity. descent and ancestry. see 
Sharona Hoffman. Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept>. 36 ARIZ. L.J. 1093 
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ethnicity in the subjective manner used by governments and the 
courts,'( though we often use an umbrella category of "racial 
criteria'' or "racial classifications" to describe race, ethnicity and 
religion together. As for nationality. we refer to nationality to 
include two concepts: the first refers to one's country of birth or 
of current citizenship. The second refers to one's national or 
ethnic origins. regardless of citizenship.31 
II. RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY: 
DO THEY STILL MA TIER? 
On May 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act. 
The Act authorized the executive branch to exclude persons of 
Chinese descent.'" Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese-born laborer 
who lived in California for many years. Before he departed the 
United States for a brief visit to his native China, he had 
obtained a certificate that would entitle him to return to the 
United States. But during his absence, Congress amended the 
law to ban the reentry of Chinese, including those with validly-
issued certificates. When Chae Chan Ping arrived at the Port of 
San Francisco, he was barred from reentering. He challenged his 
exclusion in a case that came before the Supreme Court in May 
1889 and became known as the Chinese Exclusion Case. The 
Court sustained the Chinese Exclusion Act and set ground rules 
for plenary power of the political branches over immigration 
that reverberate some 120 years later. 33 Justice Field, writing for 
a unanimous Court, noted that Chinese are racially different. 
They "remained strangers in the land. residing apart by 
themselves and adhering to the customs and usages of their own 
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our 
people or to make any change in their habits or modes of 
living. "34 Justice Field went even further to stress a demographic 
concern- "as they grew in numbers each year," they would 
(2004). 
30. The focus is direct use of race and ethnicity as opposed to using indirect traits 
that may indicate one's race and ethnicity. such as language. accent. dress code. physical 
characteristics and surnames. 
31. Some courts interpreted the term "national origin" more broadly to include the 
country from which one's ancestors came. See. e.g .. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co .. 414 U.S. 
86. 88 (1973 ). 
32. 22 Stat. 58. ch. 126. The Act was not based on citizenship but on descent. It 
applied to "all subjects of China and Chinese. whether subjects of China or anv other 
foreign power. .. with the exception of scholars and merchants. · 
33. See The Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. at 581. 
34. !d. at 595. 
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present "great danger that at no distant day that portion of our 
country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was 
taken to restrict their immigration."" The Court characterized 
the Chinese Exclusion Act as "protective legislation . .,,h 
The Chinese Exclusion Case spoke in very broad terms to 
build a structure of broad governmental powers to control 
immigration. Individual exclusion "is only an application of the 
same power to particular classes of persons, whose presence is 
deemed injurious. "37 The power to exclude aliens, and to 
prescribe terms for exclusion. is part of the nation ·s 
independence, the foreign affairs power. and the right to self-
preservation.3x This power ''cannot be granted away or 
restrained'' and is not a question ··for judicial determination ... w 
This seminal case established the so-called Plenary Power 
Doctrine, which gives Congress and the Executive an unfettered 
right to regulate immi~ation issues under a wide range of 
constitutional immunity. Immigration has been established as a 
kind of extraconstitutional area. 
120 years have passed since the Chinese Exclusion Case. Is 
this case a relic from another era or still good law? This Part 
35. /d. 
36. !d. 
37. !d. at 608 (emphasis added). Years later. the Court reaffirmed racial exclusion 
of Japanese and high-caste Hindus. See Morrison , .. California. 291 C.S. 82. 86 (1934) 
("The privilege of naturalization is denied to all who are not white (unless the applicants 
are of African nativity or African descent): and men are not white if the strain of colored 
blood in them is a h~lf or a quarter. or. not improbably. even less"): United States v. 
Thind. 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that a high-caste Hindu is not eligible for 
naturalization because he is not a "Caucasian"): Ozawa v. United States. 260 U.S. 178 
(1922) (holding that people of Japanese descent are not "white .. and hence are not an 
admissible race for naturalization). 
38. See The Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. 581. 603-04: see also Mathews v. 
Diaz. 426 U.S. 67. 81 (1976): Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753.770 (1972): Boutilier v. 
INS. 387 U.S. 118. 123 (1967): Harisiades v. Shaughnessy. 342 U.S. 580. 588-90 (1952): 
Carlson v. Landon. 342 U.S. 524. 537 (1952): Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 U.S. 537. 542 
(1950): United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp .. 299 U.S. 304. 315-18 (1936): Fong 
Yue Ting v. United Stated. 149 U.S. 698. 707 (1893): Nishimura Ekiu v. United States. 
142 U.S. 651.659 (1892): Guan Chow Tok v. INS. 456 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1972). 
39. See The Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. 581. 606-09. 
40. The literature on the plenary power doctrine is vast. See. e.g .. STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY. IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN A"iD 
AMERICA 177-222 (1987): Stephen H. Legomsky. Immigration Law and the Principle of 
Plenary Congressional Power. 6 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984): Hiroshi Motomura. 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation. 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990): Cornelia T.L. Pillard & Alexander 
Aleinikoff. Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision 
Making in Miller v. Albright. 1998 SL'P. CT. REV. 1 ( 1999). 
2010] IMMIGRATION SELECTION 249 
shows how racial classifications remain central in immigration 
policy. True, they have become less direct and arbitrary. positive 
rather than negative, nationality-based more than race-based, 
but, in principle, they are still with us after all. The discussion 
starts with nationality-based restrictions. moves to religious 
distinctions, and concludes with racial and ethnic classifications:~ 
It focuses on law and policy in the United States, though it 
provides some examples from other countries. It focuses on 
official policies and not on abuse of discretion by individual 
officers. 
A. NATIONALITY-BASED RESTRICTIONS 
Nationality-based distinctions have permeated the United 
States immigration policy for a long time. Tracing our path back 
to the National Origins Quota System of 1921. country of origin 
has played a significant role in defining U.S. immigration policy. 
Although the national origins quota system ended in 1965. 
nationality-based distinctions continue to be a foundation block 
of the U.S. system, as reflected in per-country quotas (based on 
country of birth), expedited treatment for temporary visitors 
coming from certain low-fraud countries. eligibility for the 
Diversity Visa Lottery based on country of birth, the designation 
of certain visa-issuing consulates for applications based on 
country of birth, and many other examples liberally sprinkled 
throughout the INA. There is nothing peculiarly 'American' in 
these policies. In a post-Westphalian world divided by nation-
states, nationality plays a major role in defining international 
relations. Immigration agencies are often given a wide berth to 
favor certain nationals over others in the way visas are issued, 
their length and terms. exemptions from visas. setting of country 
quotas for immigrant visas and negotiated nonimmigrant 
statuses accorded to Australians, Canadians. Chileans and 
Singaporeans. Under U.S. law. for instance. Israelis can take 
41. The focus of the Article is current and recent immigration policies. The Article 
thus avoids discussing race-based policies that were employed in the United States a long 
time ago. For past policies. see ROGER DA'.'IELS. COMI'-'G TO A\IERICA: A HISTORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND ETH;-.;ICITY !'-' A\IERICAN LIFE (2002): Jom; HIGHAM. STRANGERS 
11' THE LAND: PATTERNS OF A\IERICA"i NATIVIS\1. 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988): JOPPKE. 
supra note 5. at 36--43. 52-59: Ian F.H. Lopez. Racial Restrictions in the Law of 
Citizenship. in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY 109 
(E. Nathaniel Gates ed .. 1997): Patrick Wei!. Races at the Gate: A Centurv of Racial 
Distinctions in American Immigration Policy (}865-1965). IS GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 625 
(2001). 
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advantage of qualifying for the Treaty Trader nonimmigrant 
status, while Brazilians may not.42 
Emphasis on nationality became more intense following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.4 ' Soon thereafter, the 
Department of Justice began an aggressive new program, the 
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 
imposing entry and exit special registration requirements on 
male nonimmigrants (temporary residents), aged sixteen and 
older. from twenty-five designated countries (twenty-four Arab 
and other predominantly Muslim states, plus North Korea). 
Citizens of a designated country were required to be interviewed 
and fingerprinted. The requirements applied on the basis of 
national origin, not on the basis of one's country of citizenship.44 
But while even Jews or Christians born in such countries as 
Morocco were subject to the registration requirements, the 
impact was felt overwhelmingly by Muslims born in those 
countries. In a constitutional challenge to the NSEERS 
regulations, a Moroccan citizen argued that this registration 
scheme violated the equal protection principles of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause since it targeted only 
nationals of certain countries.4; The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny test and held that 
admission criteria solely based upon nationality are acceptable 
so long as they are "substantially related" to the achievement of 
important objectives, such as national security.46 Other courts, 
however, applied a rational basis test, holding that '"distinctions 
on basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by 
42. See § 201(c) of the INA (for allocation of family-sponsored immigrants). 
§201(d) (for employment-based immigrants).§ 217 (for Visa Waiver Program rules) and 
§ 101(a)(15)(E)(i) (for Treaty Trader nonimmigrant status). 
43. See Stephen H. Legomsky. The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Nonciti:.ens: 
National Security and International Human Rights. 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161. 163-
77 (2005). 
44. See National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). Fed. Reg. 
52584-93 (Aug. 12. 2002). The list includes "nationals or citizens" -it applies even in 
cases of dual nationals of a non-registrant country-of Afghanistan. Algeria. Bangladesh. 
Bahrain. Egypt. Eritrea. Indonesia. Iran. Iraq. Jordan. Kuwait. Lebanon. Libya. 
Morocco. North Korea. Oman. Pakistan. Qatar. Saudi Arabia Somalia. Sudan. Syna. 
Tunisia. United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Following criticism. the Department of 
Homeland Security suspended the NSEERS on December 2003. See 68 Fed. Reg. 67578 
(Dec. 2. 2003). 
45. See Kandamar v. Gonzales. 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006). 
46. /d. at 72-73 ("Congress may permissibly set immigration criteria based on an 
alien's nationality or place of origin ... [for] monitoring nationals from certain countries 
to prevent terrorism."). 
2010] IMMIGRATION SELECTION 251 
Congress or by the Executive" and "so long as such distinctions 
are not wholly irrational they must be sustained."47 
In the wake of 9111. Congress has banned the admission of 
nonimmigrant aliens from states sponsoring terrorism. Section 
306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 
2002 provides that "no nonimmigrant visa ... shall be issued to 
any alien from a country that is a state sponsor of international 
terrorism unless the Secretary of State determines ... that such 
alien does not pose a threat to the safety or national security of 
the United States."4~ The justification for this rule relies on the 
fact that all of the nineteen hijackers legally entered the country 
as nonimmigrant visitors. Some people believe that this fact 
justifies extra scrutiny of nonimmigrant Middle Eastern 
Muslims.49 But while the rule does not apply to countries such as 
Egypt or Saudi Arabia, it applies to Cuba.'o In addition, the term 
"any alien from a country" has been interpreted broadly to 
include any person born in a designated country, whether or not 
the person is a resident of that country.'! 
Some twenty-three years earlier, American courts similarly 
accepted special registration requirements targeted solely 
47. See Roudnahal v. Ridge. 310 F. Supp. 2d 884. 892 (N.D. Ohio 2003). In fact. all 
the Courts of Appeals that had considered the constitutional validity of the NSEERS 
held that special registration of aliens based on nationality did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. See Rajah v. Mukasey. 544 F.3d 427. 435 (2d Cir. 2008) 
("Classifications on the basis of nationality are frequently unavoidable in immigration 
matters ... such classifications is commonplace and almost inevitable. Indeed. the very 
concept of ·alien· is a nationality-based classification."): Malik v. Gonzales. 213 Fed. 
Appx. 173 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that courts have no jurisdiction to review equal 
protection challenges in immigration cases): Zerrei v. Gonzales. 471 F.3d 342. 347-48 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (rejecting the claim that the NSEERS violates the equal protection clause): 
Zafar v. U.S. Attorney General. 461 F.3d 1357. 1367 (llthCir. 2006) ("Petitioners' equal 
protection rights were not violated by being required to be registered in the national 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System."): Sewani v. Gonzales. 162 Fed. Appx. 285. 287 
(5th Cir. 2006) ("Due process does not require Congress to grant aliens from all nations 
with the same chances for admission to or remaining with the United States. Congress 
may permissibly set immigration criteria that are sensitive to an alien's nationality or 
place of origin."): Shaybob v. U.S. Attorney General. 189 Fed. Appx. 127. 129-30 (3d 
Cir. 2006) ("The Call-In Program does not violate the Equal Protection guarantee of the 
Fifth Amendment ... the power to exclude or expel particular classes of aliens is 
historically within the province of the political branches."): Ali v. Gonzalez. 440 F.3d 678. 
681 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Nationality classification has been repeatedly upheld by this Court 
and others against constitutional attack."). 
48. 107 Pub. L. No. 107-173. 116 Stat. 543 (2002). 
49. See Janice L. Kephart. Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9!11 
Staff Report on Terrorist Travel. CESTER FOR IMMIGRATION STCDIES (Sept. 1. 2005). 
50. This provision currently applies to Iran. Syria. Sudan and Cuba. See http:// 
travel.state.gov/visa/temp/info/info_1300.html. 
51. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 175. 
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against Iranian students present in the United States following 
the Iranian Revolution. In Narenji v. Civiletti,'" the plaintiffs 
argued that nationality distinctions among nonimmigrant 
students violated the Equal Protection Clause. In a divided en 
bane ruling. the D.C. Circuit roundly rejected this position, 
saying that the Attorney General was permitted wide latitude to 
draw distinctions on the basis of nationality, having to meet only 
a rational basis test.'' However, four dissenting judges took a 
different view. asserted that U.S. law has a "deep aversion to 
selective law enforcement against a group solely on the basis of 
their country of origin. '''4 The dissent revealed the great divide in 
U.S. immigration law: special concerns for civil and criminal 
rights of immigrants present in the country against expansive 
executive power to decide who is admitted and under what 
terms. 
Israel, too. presents an interesting case for nationality-based 
distinctions. Israeli law currently presumes that citizens or 
residents of Iran. Syria. Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian 
Authority pose a security risk.'' Thus. they are inadmissible, en 
masse.'" Israeli law is based on a "presumption of 
dangerousness" that is difficult to rebut in an individual case. In 
a constitutional challenge to the statute. The Citizenship and 
Entry into Israel Act (Temporary Order) 2003,'7 the petitioners 
claimed in the High Court of Justice (HCJ) that this policy 
discriminates against certain national groups. The petitioners. 
Palestinian citizens of Israel who asked for family reunification 
with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, argued that the 
statute presents a case of disparate impact since its effects mostly 
Palestinian citizens and has a negligible impact on Jewish 
citizens. The Israeli Government contended that the statute is 
not discriminatory as it excludes only enemy aliens, regardless 
their national origin. Had Israel wished to exclude only 
52. 617 F.2d 745. 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
53. /d. at 748. 
54. Jd. at 754. The Court really meant national origin. not just country of 
citizenship. 
55. See The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Act (Temporary Order) 2007. 
56. See Daphne Barak-Erez. Israel: Citizenship and Immigration Law in the Vise of 
Security. Nationalitv. and Human Rights. 6 INT'L J. CONST. LAW 184 (2008); Orgad. supra 
note 27. at 95-101. 
57. See S.H. 544. 
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Palestinians, it would have prohibited admission of Palestinians, 
irrespective of where they actually lived.'R 
In one of the most controversial decisions ever issued in 
Israel, the Supreme Court sitting as the HCJ sustained the 
statute.59 Justice Mishael Cheshin, speaking for the majority, 
held that the statute is not discriminatory because the person's 
nationality is only a by-product of being an enemy alien. Israeli 
Arabs can marry Palestinians all over the world, excluding only 
those territories where an armed conflict is being conducted. 
"This ban does indeed harm a minority group of which the vast 
majority are Arabs, but this harm derives from the marriage to 
enemy nationals ... and not from the fact that they are Arabs," 
Cheshin said.60 Chief Justice Barak dissented. In Barak's view, 
the statute is discriminatory because the burden falls mostly on 
Israeli Arabs. Justice Barak was willing to assume that no 
intentional discrimination existed, yet the important element is 
not intent but effect. He held that "the question is not merely 
the motivation of the decision-makers; the question is also what 
is the outcome of the decision."61 The case poses interesting 
questions: Should states measure intent or effect in evaluating 
nationality-based discrimination? Are criteria such as enmity or 
alienation the same as nationality?62 
The United States and Israel have employed nationality-
based restrictions as a counterterrorism measure. In both 
countries, the use of nationality as an immigration criterion is 
official and, in both, the justification of the criterion is 
presumably based on protecting national security. The right 
question, however, is whether nationality-based restrictions can 
be considered legitimate criteria to serve national security, which 
is generally considered a widely-accepted justification for 
limiting immigration. The answer depends, inter alia, on the 
degree to which the restrictions protect the nation's security, as 
58. The statute did not effect Palestinians all over the world exclusive of the 
Palestinian territories. 
59. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah. the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. 
the Minister of the Interior (May 14. 2006). 
60. !d. at 'I 91-92 (Cheshin. 1.. majority opinion). 
61. !d. at 'I 50--51 (Barak. C.J .. dissenting). 
62. See Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (illustrating that preferences given 
to Indians in hiring employees for the Bureau of Indian Affairs are not racial but 
political). But see Graham v. Richardson. 403 U.S. 365.372 (1971) ("Classifications based 
on alienage. like those based on nationality or race. are inherently suspect and subject to 
close judicial scrutiny."). 
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well as on their scope. Israel uses nationality to ban admission of 
immigrants designated countries with which it is at war. The rule 
applies to any immigrant, including family members, and it is 
generally impossible to rebut the presumption of dangerousness 
in individual cases. The United States uses nationality as an 
immigration criterion in a broader sense- in admission 
decisions, as in the case of nonimmigrant visitors from states 
sponsoring terrorism, and in immigration enforcement, as in the 
case of the NSEERS regulations. However, the U.S. policies do 
not apply to family members and allow individuals to present 
evidence that no real threat exists in their admission or stay in 
the country."' 
B. RELIGIOUS DISTINCTIONS 
The use of religious distinctions has increased following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.(\.\ The 9/11 Commission found that 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) failed to see 
the nexus between immigration laws and national security and 
failed to prevent the attacks. It failed to understand the high 
stakes that were involved in admitting a foreign national without 
a careful review of that person's background. The Commission 
noted that "for terrorists, travel documents are as important as 
weapons.""' In a challenge to post 9/11 detention policies aimed 
at Muslims of Middle Eastern origin, the plaintiffs asserted 
disparate treatment based on religion and national origin."" The 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
rejected the equal protection claim, holding that there is nothing 
constitutionally impermissible in singling out nationals of 
particular countries for increased enforcement. The Court 
pointed to the reasonableness of giving greater scrutiny to 
noncitizens "who shared characteristics with the hijackers, which 
included sharing the same religion, as well as the same national 
63. Orgad. supra note 27. at 95-101. 112-15. 
64. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson. Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration 
Law after September 1/, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims. 58 N.Y.U. AN:-o. 
SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo. Immigration Reform, 
National Security after September 1/, and the Future of North American Integration. 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1369 (2007); Legomsky. supra note 43, at 163-77. 
65. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U:'<ITED 
STATES 384-85 (2004). 
66. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft. 2006 WL 1662663 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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origins ... [t]his approach may have been crude, but it was not 
so irrational or outrageous. "li7 
When the Department of Justice issued its NSEERS 
registration rules in the summer of 2002, it explained that the 
executive branches have to be given broad discretion to make 
these distinctions. In Rajah v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit 
upheld the registration requirement, aimed exclusively at 
citizens of certain Muslim-dominated countries, under the 
facially legitimate, bona fide standard.68 The Court held that it is 
"plainly rational attempt to enhance national security" and 
added: 
To be sure. the Program did select countries that were, with 
the exception of North Korea, predominantly Muslim. 
Petitioners argue, without evidence other than that fact, that 
the Program was motivated by an improper animus toward 
Muslims. However, one major threat of terrorist attacks 
comes from radical Islamic ~roups .... [t]he Program was 
clearly tailored to those facts. 6 
The Court noted that not all Muslims were made subject to 
the registration requirements but only those from predominantly 
Muslim countries. The Program also required non-Muslims from 
designated countries to be subject to the registration. We thus 
have the irony that even Jews who were born in one of the 
designated countries, and who might well be subject to 
persecution if they were to return to those countries, are subject 
to the registration requirements. One could suggest that the 
inclusion of non-Muslims was designed primarily to fend-off 
criticism that the Program was directed solely against a certain 
religion- that is, Islam. Indeed, the inclusion of non-Muslims 
was a key factor in the Program being held constitutional. 
Therefore, one must ask whether a registration program that 
targeted ONLY Muslims would be acceptable under different 
factual circumstances. 
In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a similar 
course. In this case, a Pakistani citizen of Muslim origin argued 
that he was detained and tortured based on his Muslim 
67. /d. at 132. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft. 
589 F.3d 542 (2nd Cir. 2009) (""Plaintiffs point to no authority clearly establishing an 
equal protection right to be free of selective enforcement of the immigration laws based 
on national origin. race. or religion ... ). 
68. See Rajah v. Mukasey. 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008). 
69. /d. at 439. 
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background. In a five to four decision. the Supreme Court ruled 
that proving purposeful discrimination. the level needed under 
the liability standard. means showing "'more than intent as 
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. "70 It requires 
that the decision maker adopted a policy '"not for neutral, 
investigation reason," such as protecting national security, "but 
for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or 
national origin. "71 It means that a Muslim man must prove that 
he was intentionally discriminated against because of his religion; 
it is not considered unlawful discrimination if the religious traits 
are merely incidental to a neutral investigation. At the end of its 
opinion, the Court issued the following statement:'2 
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab 
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good 
standing of a! Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. AI 
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim-Osama bin 
Laden-and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim 
disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy 
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a 
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims. 
Justice Kennedy held that the religion of the petitioners is 
merely an incidental impact of the War on Terror. In his view. 
the Attorney General did not purposefully target Muslims 
because of their religion, but because they "had potential 
connections to those who committed terrorist acts. "'3 When one 
applies this precedent to immigration, where the power of the 
executive is plenary, it might be more difficult to exclude 
religion distinctions when the policy is not motivated by 
prejudice. 
Religious distinctions are utilized in other countries as well. 
In September 2005, the Minister of the Interior of the German 
Land of Baden-Wi.irttemberg introduced a new citizenship test 
intended to assess the loyalty of immigrants into the German 
democratic basic order. Under this policy, such loyalty was 
assessed through an interview in which the immigrant was asked 
to reveal her personal beliefs on issues of equality, freedom of 
religion, conversion, homosexuality, and culture. At the 
70. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937.1940 (2009). 
71. !d. at 1949. 
72. /d. at 1951 (emphasis added). 
73. /d. 
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beginning, the test only applied to applicants from one of the 
fifty-seven Member States of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, or applicants "appearing to be Muslims."74 
Following criticism, the Muslims-only application had changed 
to any apJ?lican~ ~'whose_ lo~alty to the G~rman Basic Law is 
doubted."· Rehg10us cntena were also Implemented at the 
German federal level. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Federal 
Government employed a data mining system to expose terrorist 
sleeper cells. About 300,000 persons were identified as potential 
terrorists required to go through a closer inspection. The system 
(Rasterfahndung) was founded on the screening of personal data 
held by public and private institutions of every: 
Male. aged 18 to 40. (ex-)student, Islamic religious affiliation, 
native country or nationality of certain countries, named in 
detail, with predominantly Islamic population.76 
The German 'terrorist profile' thus contained factors such 
as age, gender and religion; being a Muslim was openly a 
relevant criterion based on an alleged correlation between 
Islamic religious affiliation and the tendency to terrorism. In a 
landmark 2006 decision, the German Constitutional Court 
invalidated the policy aimed predominantly against Muslims. 
The Court found the policy to be unconstitutional, having a 
stigmatizing impact against German Muslims, as long as religion 
is the sole or the decisive criterion. Nevertheless, the decision 
indicates that religious distinctions are not disqualified per se, 
but only when religion is the decisive factor. 77 
The religious background of immigrants was a sole criterion 
of immigrant selection in neither Germany nor the United 
States. But while in Germany religious criteria were explicit and 
formal, the United States has claimed that religion had never 
been an explicit immigration criterion but just an incidental 
impact of the War on Terror. Perhaps this is one of the reasons 
for its invalidation in Germany and approval in the United 
States. Another difference is rooted in the different test used: 
while the U.S. Supreme Court has examined intentions, the 
74. See Islamic Human Rights Commission. The Ober-Citizen and German 
Kulturkampf- s.lO German Naturalisation Law: A Front? (2007). 
75. /d. 
76. See Gabriele Kett-Straub. Data Screening of Muslim Sleepers Unconstitutional. 
7 GERMAN L.J. 967.970 (2006). 
77. /d. at 971-75. 
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German Constitutional Court has also emphasized the 
importance of the policy's disparate racial impact. 
C. RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATIONS 
Is race a criterion for immigrant selection? In Jean v. 
Nelson, 78 the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the 
question of whether the Government could deny parole to 
Haitians fleeing their country, if the denials were race-based. 79 
The plaintiffs had argued that black Haitians were being denied 
entry while predominantly white Cubans were allowed to be 
paroled into the United States. The majority declined to 
answer that question, holding that the regulations governing 
grants of parole were facially neutral. The majority remanded 
the case to the lower court to decide whether the "race-
neutral" regulations were being implemented without regard to 
race or nationality. 80 But what if the regulations were explicitly 
race-based? Would they have passed constitutional muster? To 
judge from a decision of the Second Circuit, race-based 
regulations can survive judicial review. In Bertrand v. Sava, the 
court examined the question whether an exclusion of Haitians 
without parole constituted racial discrimination against blacks 
and Haitians. Judge Cabranes recognized the power of the 
government to exercise an unrestricted right to regulate 
admission criteria, noting that "no one disputes [that] Congress 
may employ race or national origin as criteria in determining 
which aliens to exclude. "81 That is because "the wide latitude 
historically afforded to the political branches of our national 
government in immigration matters permits them to adopt even 
wholly irrational policies. "82 The Second Circuit cited with 
approval the lower court's very sweeping pronouncement that 
"constitutionally suspect or impermissible [criteria] in the 
context of domestic policy, namely, race, physical condition, 
78. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
79. Parole is a term of art used in U.S. immigration law that refers to the 
government's action in allowing an alien seeking entry to remain at liberty during the 
adjudication of his case, as opposed to being detained while the case is decided. 
80. The dissenting opinion refused to avoid the constitutional question of equal 
protection and ruled that even though "national origin can sometimes be a permissible 
consideration in immigration policy ... national origin (let alone race) cannot control 
every decision in any way related to immigration." !d. at 881 (Marshall & Brennan JJ.. 
dissenting). 
81. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 1982). 
82. /d. 
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political beliefs, sexual proclivities, age, and national origin," 
can be permissible in immigration policy.83 
Although it is possible to find examples for using ethnic 
criteria in U.S. immigration law, such as the NSEERS that 
predominantly applied to citizens of Arab states, the use of 
ethnicity is more common in other countries. One of its forms is 
ethnic inclusion. Under Israeli law, people of Jewish ancestry 
have an automatic right to enter Israel and become citizens. 
While admission is possible in other cases as well-e.g., foreign 
workers and asylum seekers-naturalization of non-Jews is 
rarely granted, with the exception of non-Jewish family 
members. Citizenship is generally granted onl~ to ethnic Jews, 
that is, persons with a Jewish grandparent. Ethnicity is a 
common criterion in Eastern Europe too. It is used for makin§ 
immigration preferences to noncitizens of certain ethnic groups. 5 
Ethnicity plays a highly controversial role in the practice of 
certain European countries. The British policy toward nationals 
of Romani ethnic origin is an example. The Home Office 
employed a policy aimed at stopping people seeking asylum 
from boarding planes to Britain from the Czech Republic. But 
while only 0.2 percent of non-Roma was denied entry, ninety 
percent of Roma was barred. In addition, about eighty percent 
of Roma were targeted for a secondary immigration interview 
compared to less than one percent of non-Roma. Roma, thus, 
were four hundred times more likely to be refused entry to 
Britain than non-Roma. The British immigration authorities 
officially employed discriminatory regulations under which: 
The fact that a passenger belongs to one of these ethnic or 
national groups will be sufficient to justify discrimination-
without reference to additional statistical or intelligence 
83. /d. The court overruled the district court's decision, finding that the Attorney 
General impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race and national origins. See Vigile 
v. Sava. 535 F. Supp 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But even the lower court noted that while it is 
impermissible for a district director to apply racial criteria, "Congress may employ race 
or national origin as criteria in determining which aliens to exclude." /d. at 1016. This 
decision has never been explicitly overruled. 
84. See general/v SHLOMO AVINERI, L!A V 0RGAD & AMNON RUBINSTEIN 
MANAGING GLOBAL. MIGRATION: A STRATEGY FOR ISRAELI IMMIGRATION POLIC~ 
(Ruth Gavison ed .. 2010). 
85. See ALEXANDER Y AKOBSON & AMNON RUBINSTEIN, ISRAEL AND THE 
FAMILY OF NATIONS: THE JEWISH NATION-STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126-33 (2010). 
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information- if an immi§,ration officer considers such 
discrimination is warranted. 
The House of Lords held that U.K. immigration officers 
were discriminating against Roma only because they were 
Roma. Lord Steyn ruled that Roma were "discriminated on the 
grounds of race" and, further, that the motive for this 
discrimination is "irrelevant."87 The House of Lords noted that 
"the law reports are full of examples of obviously discriminatory 
treatment which was in no way motivated by racism." 88 The 
decisive factor is therefore not intents, but effects. 
Different types of racial and ethnic classifications appear 
not only in law reports but also in official census. Some countries 
record statistics according to ethnic origin (Caucasians, Asians, 
Hispanic, etc.) and national origin (Cubans, Mexicans, etc.); 
others apply different rules for different ethnic immigrants. In 
Israel, for example, immigrants of Jewish origin are not 
considered "immigrants" -they are returners (olim) who return 
to their land. The rules that govern their entry are embodied in 
The Law of Return, which grants them an almost automatic 
admission. A separate ministry, the Ministry of Immigrant 
Absorption, exists to provide them with generous financial and 
social benefits. Unlike ethnic Jews, non-Jewish immigrants need 
to go through a burdensome process, governed by the Entry into 
Israeli Law and administered by the Ministry of the Interior. In 
the Netherlands, official statistics distinguish between native 
Dutch ( allochtoon) and foreigners ( allochtonen) and, unlike 
other countries, also differentiate between Western and non-
Western foreigners. 89 People of Dutch descent are Nederlanders 
or autochthonous. In Germany, article 116 of the Constitution 
embraces an ethnic definition of being German. It includes 
ethnic Germans living outside Germany in Eastern Europe-if 
coming to Germany they are resettlers- and Jews deprived their 
citizenship under the Third Reich.'Xl In the United States, such 
distinctions do not exist, though one's race could be defined, 
86. See Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004) UKHL 55. 
87. /d. at 36. Roma are actually an ethnic rather than a racial group. See Janko v. 
Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
88. /d. at 82. 
89. See Evelyn Ersanilli, Netherlands, Country Profile 1-2 Focus MIGRATION 
(2007) ("Western allochtonen are people from Europe (excluding Turkey), North 
America. Oceania. Indonesia and Japan; non-Western allochtonen are defined as people 
from Turkey. Africa, Latin American and the rest of Asia."). 
90. JOPPKE, supra note 5, at 182-88. 
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albeit non-legally, by the "hyphen", that is, African-Americans, 
Asian-Americans and Jewish-Americans. 
So do race, religion and nationality matter in immigrant 
selection? They surely do. In his compelling book, Joppke maps 
out different types of ethnic selection in liberal democracies. He 
shows how ethnic selection becomes more indirect than 
straightforward, more peripheral than central, and more positive 
than negative.~1 Joppke's observations are well-established. One 
will have a difficult time to find an openly racist policy of 
excluding certain kinds of immigrants, such as the Chinese 
Exclusion Act. It is also true that while ethnic criteria were 
dominant in the past in one country's immigration policy, they 
are generally subordinate today. The British policy toward 
Roma and the German policy toward persons of Muslim descent 
are the exceptions to the generally non-ethnic immigration 
policies of those countries. Nevertheless, one should not think 
that ethnic immigration classifications have disappeared.92 As 
this Part shows, they are still used in different contexts 
(admission, enforcement, naturalization, removal), serve 
different purposes (border security, cultural preservation), and 
apply to different tyges of law enforcement strategies for 
different time periods and regarding different types of aliens 
(family immigrants, permanent residents, visitors). 
The use of racial immigration criteria is strengthened by 
three reasons. First, the War on Terror has revived immigrant 
selection based on nationality and religion. Nationality-based 
restrictions are increasingly considered to be a counter-terrorism 
measure.
94 Second, cultural tensions and theories about "clash of 
civilizations" have accelerated the use of culture as a criterion of 
immigrant selection. In his controversial book, Who Are We?, 
Samuel Huntington called on Congress to adopt immigration 
criteria aimed at preserving the so-called "Anglo-Protestant 
culture. "9' Criteria of religion and culture have increasingly been 
91. /d. at 219-50. 
92. /d. at 219 (finding that the role of ethnicity in Western immigration policies 
during the last decades '"has shrunk'" but not disappeared). 
93. For the importance role of the time-limit of discriminatory immigration 
provisions. see Daphne Barak-Erez. Terrorism and Profiling: Shifting the Focus from 
Criteria to Effects. 29 CAR. L. REV. 1. 7 (2007). 
94. THE NATIOI"AL COMMISSIOI" O;>.; TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES. supra note 65. at 385-90. 
95. See generally SAMUEL HliNTINGTON. WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO 
AMERICA's NA TIOI"AL IDEI"TITY (2004 ). 
262 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:237 
used as gatekeepers to oversee the quantity and quality of 
immigrants, especially in Europe.% This raises a question: is 
cultural exclusion the same as racial exclusion? Culture, very 
often, is not "race-blind"; it has a disparate racial impact. Third, 
countries use ethnicity as a means of immigrant inclusion more 
than they used before. In Eastern Europe in particular, there is a 
process of re-ethnicization under which nation-states grant 
privileges to ethnic diaspora in admission and eligibility to 
citizenship. 
III. RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY: ARE THEY 
LEGALLY PERMITTED? 
Part II describes how, as a matter of policy. race. religion 
and nationality still matter in the process of immigration 
selection. Part III is normative: It explores whether the use of 
such criteria is legally permitted. The question of what criteria 
are permitted in immigrant selection depends not only on the 
justification they serve-for the sake of the discussion. this Part 
assumes that they serve a legitimate aim- but also on the 
normative perspective. The question is whether race, religion 
and nationality can ever be legitimate criteria provided that they 
serve a legitimate purpose. This Part briefly discusses three 
normative perspectives to analyze legitimate and illegitimate 
immigration criteria: constitutional law, international human 
rights law, and moral philosophy. Each approach imposes a 
different set of constraints on states' power to decide who to let 
. d k 97 man eep out. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In theory, the power to regulate immigration criteria is 
restrained by the Constitution. In reality, however, the 
possibility of applying constitutional standards to disqualifying 
criteria of immigrant selection is either unavailable or available 
to a lesser degree. Some reasons for this reality are rooted in 
U.S. constitutional law: The limited application of the 
Constitution outside the U.S. territory, the focus on intent rather 
than effect, and the implied permission to use race-based 
criteria. Other reasons relate to U.S. immigration law-a field 
96. See Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and 
Access to Citizenship in Europe. 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 53.63-83 (2010). 
97. The described normative perspectives feed each other and often overlap. 
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related to foreign affairs powers, in which judicial deference to 
the executive is likely due to the plenary power doctrine. 
Immigration rules, more than any other field, have been seen as 
an "extraconstitutional area. "98 
First, the Constitution does not regularly apply to persons 
located outside the territory. In an instructive book, with an 
insightful title, Strangers to the Constitution,~ Gerald Neuman 
shows how aliens outside the sovereign territory have usually 
been considered outside the protections of the Constitution. 
They may have claims under international or statutory law, but 
the Constitution does not generally apply extraterritorially to 
noncitizens and, therefore, does not provide substantive 
constitutional protection to aliens outside the sovereign 
territory.](xl 
Second, constitutional law may provide little help to 
immigrants even when the Constitution does apply to 
immigration decisions, as in the cases of immigration 
enforcement, naturalization or removal. In these cases, the 
Constitution does apply within the U.S. territory yet its 
protection is limited since the use of group-based criteria is 
generally permissible in U.S. constitutional law. It usually 
occurs when law enforcement agencies know enough data, 
based on statistical patterns, about characteristics of a class of 
crimes. They use deductive profiles to target J>otential 
offenders by relying on a set of characteristics/ which, 
although not a suspect-specific description, are considered a 
good indicator for the tendency to commit certain crimes.10' 
The American NSEERS regulations, the Israeli statute on 
family reunification, the German data mining system, and the 
British immigration policy toward Roma were all based on 
generalizations in which ethnicity, religion or nationality were a 
98. See Legomsky. Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Power. supra 
note 40. at 255. 
99. See generally GERALD L NEUMAN. STRA!\IGERS TO THE CONSTJTUTJO:-<: 
IMMIGRANTS. BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW ( 1996 ). 
100. A consular denial of a visa is generally not judicially reviewable. See Bruno v. 
Albright. 197 F.3d 1153. 1159-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Ventura Escamilla v. INS. 647 F.2d 28. 
30 (9th Cir. 1981 ): Li Hing of Hong Kong. Inc. v. Levin. 800 F.2d 970. 971 (9th Cir. 1986 ): 
Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
101. See Wayne Petherick. The Role of Profiling in American Society: Criminal 
Profiling: What's in a Name? Comparing Applied Profiling Methodologies. 5 J. L. & Soc. 
CHALLENGES 173 (2003 ). 
102. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER. PROFILES. PROBABILITIES. A!\ID 
STEREOTYPES (2003 ). 
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proxy for predicting future behavior. But while the Israeli High 
Court of Justice, the German Constitutional Court and the 
British House of Lords found these policies to be racially 
discriminatory, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider 
such policies a Fourth Amendment violation. In Whren v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that race can 
legitimately be used as long as other independent reasonable 
factors exist. 10' The Court affirmed that "subjective intentions 
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis." 1().1 It noted that race claims must be addressed to the 
Equal Protection Clause 105 and, as a result. set the stage for a 
permissible use of race to predict crimes-as long as race is 
only one among other suspicion factors. 106 During the 1970s, the 
U.S. Supreme Court sustained the use of ''Mexican 
appearance" in law enforcement along the Mexican border 
inasmuch as it was not the sole factor for the decision. The 
Court noted that "the likelihood that any given person of 
Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican 
appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not 
justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are 
aliens. " 107 These cases indicate that the use of racial 
immigration criteria, even in the U.S. territory. is a matter of 
degree; it is not constitutionally forbidden in principle. 
Third, in principle, U.S. constitutional law focuses more on 
intent than effect. 108 Disparate impact alone is not determinative. 
It is hard to prove a prima facie case of discrimination relying 
solely on disproportionate statistic patterns. In Bertrand v. Sava, 
the Second Circuit dismissed Haitians' claim of racial 
discrimination based on highly disproportionate impact. The 
Court noted that even if the test of disparate impact can be 
applied in ''employment and housing." immigration is a different 
103. 517 u.s. 806.813 (1996). 
104. /d. 
105. /d. ( .. The constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory 
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause. not the Fourth Amendment"). 
106. /d.: see also United States v. Weaver. 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992). 
107. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873. 886--87 (1975): see also 
United States v. Martinez-Fuente. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). This conclusion. however. is not 
clear-cut. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police. 251 F.3d 612. 635 (7th Cir. 2001): United 
States v. Montero-Camargo. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000): United States v. Avery 137 
F.3d 343. 354-55 (6th Cir. 1997). 
108. For the test of purposeful discrimination. see United States v Armstrong. 517 
US 456.465 (1996): McCleskey v Kemp. 481 US 279.291-99 (1987): Washington v Davis. 
426 us 229.239-41 (1976). 
2010] IMMIGRATION SELECTION 265 
field. 109 Thus, as Professor Neuman notes. if there is neither 
racial motivation nor racial terminology in an immigration 
statute, the statute might be constitutionally defensible. 11 '' 
Focusing on intent to discriminate instead of disparate racial 
impact is meaningful when nationality is used as a proxy for 
racial exclusion. In Jean v. Nelson, Justice Marshall held that it is 
generally unlawful to use race or national origin in immigration 
discrimination yet supported nationality-based restrictions. ''For 
better or worse," he declared, "nationality classifications have 
played an important role in our immigration policy." 111 Indeed, 
scholars like David Martin and Gerald Neuman recognize the 
use of nationality-based criteria in admission of noncitizens. 
Martin argues that nationality is "closely related to genuine 
foreign policy decisions.'' 112 while Neuman asserts that 
"distinctions in federal law among aliens on the basis of their 
country of current nationality are not constitutionally suspect ... 
if these distinctions are not defined in terms of race and are not 
motivated by racial prejudice. "113 Yet. national ongm 
discrimination is sometimes akin to racial discrimination. 
Including Cubans while excluding Haitians is an example of a 
policy, which, although grounded on nationality, is not racially-
neutral. U.S. constitutional law does not distinguish between 
immigration criteria of race, ethnicity, religion. and nationality. 
Nonetheless, citizens of countries such as China, Japan, Israel, 
Mexico, Egypt, and Ireland do not share only nationality but 
also a religion and ethnic origin. And yet, although nationality-
based discrimination may be permissible in immigrant selection, 
the question of whether nationality can be used as a proxy for 
racial discrimination in immigrant selection remains open. 
109. Bertrand. 684 F.2d 204. 218 (2d Cir. 1982). 
110. See Gerald L. Neuman. Terrorism, Selective Deportation. and the First 
Amendment After Reno v. AADC. 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313.340 (2000). 
111. See Nelson. 472 U.S. 846. 864: see also Reno v. America-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee. 525 U.S. 471. 491 (1999) ("The Executive should not have to 
disclose its ·rear reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat ... 
even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity 
and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.""): Romero v. INS. 399 F.3d 109 (2d Ci;. 
2005) (upholding a program that awarded legal status to nationals of certain Central 
American countries. but not to Mexican nationals. by pointing to broad plenary power to 
regulate matters of immigration). 
112. See David A. Martin. On Cowuerintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right 
Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC. 14 GEO. 1\!MIGR. L.J. 363.364 (2000). 
113. See Neuman. supra note 110. at 340. 
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Proving intentional discrimination can be a more difficult 
task in light of the case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In this case, as we 
have seen in Part II, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld religious-
based discrimination as long as the policy does not purposefully 
target against a specific religious group. Justice Kennedy ruled 
that a law enforcement policy that produces a disparate impact 
against Muslims is legitimate unless it has targeted Muslims 
because, and only because, they are Muslims. 114 
Fourth, the plenary power doctrine has largely removed 
the immigration issue from U.S. constitutional law. especially on 
entry decisions. The time-tested proposition is that "[i]n the 
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, 
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens." 11 ' This is due to the uniqueness of the 
immigration field and its being interwoven with political 
questions and foreign affairs powers. In principle, the use of 
race, religion and nationality is more common in the context of 
persons seeking admission. In this context, U.S. courts have 
usually upheld the Government's broad scope of permissible 
authority to base decisions on race. As Kevin Johnson has 
written, race is central to the enforcement of U.S. immigration 
law, particularly near the borders. 116 Administrative policies are 
entitled to deference, although courts may require a rational 
basis showing to justify them. But when Congress passes an 
immigration law, courts grant a wider degree of deference and 
are inclined to find these laws constitutional. Nevertheless, one 
must ask whether courts would uphold the constitutionality of an 
immigration statute that clearly discriminates on the basis of 
race or religion. Some critics of U.S. immigration policy, such as 
Peter Brimelow, trace our woes to the 1965 Act that ended the 
national origins quota system. 11 i Brimelow and like-minded 
restrictionists openly call on Congress to pass laws that would 
favor white Anglo-Saxon immigrants, and would bar the world's 
unwashed from being able to enter the United States. Although 
no court has explicitly held such discrimination to be a violation 
of the equal protection principles, it is significant that at least 
114. See Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937.1940.1949-51 (2009). 
115. See Mathews v. Diaz. 426 U.S. 67. 79-80 (1976): Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 
U.S. 537. 544 (1950). 
116. See Kevin J. Johnson. The Case Againsl Race Profiling In lmmigrlllion 
Enforcemen/. 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000) . 
. 117. See generally PETER BRIMELOW. ALIEJ'\ NATION: CO\IMON SENSE ABOL"T 
AMERICA ·s lMMIGRA TION DISASTER (1996 ). 
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eight Supreme Court Justices have suggested that such 
legislation would be impermissible (although never in one 
opinion, and always in dissent). 11s As no such legislation has 
recently passed Congress, the closest we have come to a 
definitive answer is the question posed by Justice Marshall in his 
dissent in Jean v. Nelson. Justice Marshall rejected the possibility 
that the government may discriminate on the basis of race "in 
the absence of any reasons closely related to immigration 
concerns. ,n
9 He admitted that a constitutional claim would fail 
when it "lie[s] at the heart of immigration policy," and added 
that "the individuality of the alien" is a factor only when "central 
immigration concerns are not at stake."120 Yet, even Marshall's 
dissent is far more modest than the absolute prohibition under 
British law. In the Roma case, the House of Lords has ruled that 
'"if a person acts on racial grounds, the reason why he does so is 
irrelevant. " 121 
As a policy matter, the Constitution may impose some base-
line protections in admission cases. This may be the case if one 
examines immigration issues through the lens of citizens' rights. 
One example is the case of family migration, an issue that 
touches upon not only interests of noncitizens, but also 
constitutional rights of citizens, such as equal protection and 
family life. One could argue, for example, that a regulation that 
excludes family members on the basis of race or religion would 
not pass constitutional muster due to its discriminatory effect on 
American citizens. 122 As positive law, this route is not clear-cut. 
U.S. courts have failed to recognize a fundamental right of 
118. See Gabriel J. Chin. Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constillltional Law of Immigration. 46 UCLA L. REV. I (1998). Chin points out that at 
least nine federal circuit courts have suggested that racial classifications are "lawful per 
se ... !d. at 33. 
119. 472 U.S. 846.882. 
120. !d. at 881. 
121. Regina. UKHL 55 at 82. 
122. See Kevin R. Johnson. Race, the Immigration Laws. and Domestic Race 
Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness. 73 IND. L.J. 1111. 1150-53 
(1998): Linda Kelly. Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing 
Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Baule of Plenary Power Versus 
Aliens' Rights. 41 VILL. L. REV. 725 (1996): Hiroshi Motomura. Whose Alien Nation 7 : 
Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law. 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927. 1947 (1996): 
Hiroshi Motomura. Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitwion. 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1567. 1572-73 (1997): Gerald M. Rosberg. The Protection of Aliens from 
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Gm·ernment. SUP. CT. REV. 275. 326-27 
(1977). 
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American citizens to live together with noncitizen family 
members. 12-' 
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
International human rights law asks whether a policy 
violates a protected right under international law and whether 
this violation. if exists, is unlawful. At first glance. international 
law seems to ban racial criteria. Article 1 ( 1) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination provides that: 
··racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour. descent, or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition. enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal footing. of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the politicaL economic, sociaL cultural or any 
other field of public life. 12~ 
This clause is perhaps the broadest existing definition of 
racial discrimination. It defines "race" broadly to include color, 
descent ethnic and national origin- although not religion or 
country of birth: it forbids any "distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference" based on "race''; it outlaws any policy that has 
racial purpose or effect; and it bans the use of "'race'' to deprive 
rights. but also to ''impair the recognition, enjoyment, or 
exercise, on an equal footing" of freedoms. 
Applying international human rights law to an immigration 
context is not an easy task. 12 ' First, international law norms are 
not always enforceable in domestic law. In the United States, for 
example. individuals do not have self-executing rights not to be 
discriminated against based on international conventions.126 
123. See. e.g. Fiallo v. Bell. 430 U.S. 787. 800 (1977). For a review. see Kif 
Augustine-Adams. The Plenarr Power Doctrine After September 11. 38 U.C. DAVIS L 
RE\·. 701.706-11 (2005). - -
124. See The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. 1965 60 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965) (henceforth: ··cERD"). 
125. This Part does not discuss rights derived from specific treaties. such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. or regional treaties. such as the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples· Rights. 
126. The United States ratified the CERD with several reservations. One is that the 
CERD is not self-executing. See generally Lori F. Damrosch. The Role of the United 
States Senate Concerning 'Self-Executing' and ·.Von-Self-Executing' Treaties, 67 CHI.-
KE:--<T L RE\'. 515 ( 1991 ). 
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Second, article 1(2) to the CERD makes clear that it does not 
apply to distinctions between "citizens and non-citizens." Third. 
article 1(3) to the CERD provides that it should not be 
interpreted in any way to deprive States Parties' power on issues 
of "nationality" and "citizenship or naturalization." provided 
that the policies ''do not discriminate against any particular 
nationality." In interpreting this clause. the U.N. Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has recalled that 
discrimination occurs only if the criteria "are not applied 
pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the 
achievement of this aim. ,m That is, racial discrimination may be 
permissible under the CERD after fulfilling some conditions. 
Indeed, the International Court of Justice held that 
"international law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules 
governing the grant of its nationality." 12" Fourth, article 1(1) to 
the CERD defines racial discrimination only when it comes to 
discrimination of "human rights and fundamental freedoms." As 
Professor Legomsky noted, the question whether entry and 
access to citizenship have become "human rights and 
fundamental freedoms," which fall under the CERD's definition, 
is at least controversial. 129 And last, it is doubtful whether 
admission criteria fall under the protection of the CERD. 
International treaties usually apply within the state territory, or 
to people subjecting to its jurisdiction.130 The European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that under "international law, the 
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial," and 
that treaties are not "designed to be applied throughout the 
world. ,m 
While the use of racial immigration classifications is not 
clearly impermissible under international law, the use of 
nationality-based restrictions seems to be permissible. This 
proposition is well-established. For example, in 1984, the Inter-
127. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the 
Convention. UNITED NATI0:'-1. CERD/C/DEN/C0/17 (Oct. 19. 2006) (emphasis added). 
128. See Liechtenstein v. Guatemala 1955 I.C.J. 4. 
129. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 193-96. 
130. See. e.g .. art. 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
1966. 999 U.N.T.S. 171: art. I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. art. 8. opened for signature Apr. 11. 1950. 213 
U.N.T.S. 222. 
131. See Bankovi v. Belgium. II BHRC 435 (2001 ). But see Ilascu v. Moldova. Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 48787/99 (2004) (holding that international treaties apply wherever the state has 
jurisdiction). It can be claimed. however. that the prohibition of racial discrimination is 
part of customary international law. 
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American Court of Human Rights ruled that preferences in 
naturalization criteria issued by Costa Rica for nationals of 
Central American countries, Spaniards and Ibero-Americans is 
compatible with the American Convention on Human Rights 
and presents no case of discrimination. 132 The Court ruled that 
"no discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a 
legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations which are 
contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. "133 The 
Court justified granting preferences for Central American 
nationals by noting that they are "closer historical, cultural and 
spiritual bonds with the people of Costa Rica ... [Central 
American nationals will] identify more readily with the 
traditional beliefs, values and institutions of Costa Rica, which 
the state has the right and duty to preserve."134 Similarly, the 
European Court of Human Rights upheld nationality-based 
distinctions when there is "an objective and reasonable 
justification" in such a policy. 135 
International human rights law limits states' power to 
regulate immigration criteria. States' capacity to set up 
immigration terms is more limited today than it was a few 
decades ago. Yet, within the current international law regime, 
states can still find new ways to restrict immigration based on 
invidious distinctions. International human rights law rarely 
interferes in regulation of immigration policy.136 And it does not 
contain an explicit prohibition against racial discrimination in 
immigration; on the contrary: it contains specific exemptions. 
C. MORAL PHILOSOPHY: DISTRIBUTIVE AND CORRECTIVE 
JUSTICE 
States' power to regulate immigration can also be 
restrained by the principle of justice, if not as a matter of 
positive law at least on the basis of moral grounds. One 
element of justice derives from the theory of distribute justice. 
A proponent of domestic distributive justice asks to allocate 
goods in a well-bounded political community; it presupposes a 
132. See Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization 
Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (OC-4/84 ). 
133. /d. para 57-60. 
134. /d. 
135. See C. v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996). 
136. Augustine-Adams. supra note 123. at 721-34. 
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community. 1'" The decisive question is "'what is good for us" 
(whatever the definition of "us" means). A proponent of global 
distributive justice challenges the idea of domestic justice and 
takes the view that goods are generally to be distributed 
globally. In The Case for Open Borders, Carens makes a case 
for global application of a Rawlsian theory of distributive 
justice.13s But while Rawls's theory is limited to a defined state, 
Carens has doubts whether that is (or can be) morally justified. 
The principle of justice may serve as a justification for 
inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. A voiding the questions of 
what are the goods needed to be distributed and how,139 the 
theory of justice says little about the criteria to distributive 
justice. It indicates that immigration criteria may serve as a 
device to mitigate global injustice and promote moral duties. In 
this view, people should be allowed entry not because they have 
a constitutional right, or a protected right under international 
law, but due to a moral obligation. As long as one believes in 
global distributive justice, ethnic criteria seem to be arbitrary 
because everybody has an equal moral right to enter.140 But as 
long as global justice means utilizing immigration criteria as a 
device for mitigate global inequalities-and inasmuch as one 
believes that this is a justified purpose -one might argue that 
ethnic criteria should play a role when one can identify certain 
ethnic classes in need. True, justice should usually be blind to 
one's class and be race-neutral. Justice is about individuals: 
"from each, according to his ability, to each, according to his 
need," to quote Marx. Nonetheless, in deciding one's ability and 
needs, countries may use one's status. Some societies have more 
goods while others have more needs, and these societies 
frequently have ethnic characteristics. The justification of the 
criterion derives here from the justification of the end it serves. 
137. See Stephen Macedo. The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy: Open 
Borders Versus Social Justice. in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 63 (Carol M. Swain ed .. 
2007): RAWLS. supra note 13. at 18: WALZER. supra note 22. at 31. 61--D2. 
13R See Carens. supra note 16. at 234. 
139. A great contribution on the question of who owes whom what has been made 
by Stephen Macedo. See Macedo. supra note 137. at 70. 75-76: Stephen Macedo. What 
Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and the Law of the 
Peoples. 72 FORD. L. REV. 1721 (2004). 
140. An open door policy might. on the other hand. impoverish sending countries 
and might cause serious brain-drain problems there. See MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT: A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC EXERCISE FOR THE WORLD BANK 
GROl'P 22 (2007). 
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Another element of justice stems from one of the principles 
underlying tort law-corrective justice. Under this view, states 
need to take into account past wrongs in deciding what policy to 
adopt. Corrective justice emphasizes past behavior of the parties 
in order to impose future liability. In the immigration context, 
one example is the pattern of European states in granting 
preferential treatment by issuing visas, residence permits and 
citizenship status to people from former colonies: Algerians in 
France; Indonesians, Moluccans and Surinames in the 
Netherlands; and Sub-Saharan Africans in the UK. 141 True, there 
were selfish economic reasons for these privileges, but one 
justification was a redress for past wrongs. 142 Another example is 
the German welcoming treatment of Jewish immigrants from the 
Former Soviet Union during the 1990s, and the preferential 
treatment given to Samoans to settle in New Zealand under the 
Samoan Quota Scheme. In these cases, special ethnic 
immigration treatment is given partly or wholly as reparation for 
past exploitation. 
Countries sometimes grant preferential treatment to their 
ethnic diaspora. Both the Finnish preferential immigration 
treatment toward Karelians and the Turkish policy toward 
Ahisha Turks from the F.S.U. have been justified on the basis of 
past sufferings under the communist regime.143 Redress for past 
injustice is one of the justifications of the Israeli Law of Return, 
granting automatic entry to every Jewish immigrant. Asa Kasher 
justifies this law by invoking the doctrine of affirmative action. 
In his view. ethnic groups deprived of their right to self-
determination are entitled, as a temporary remedial policy, to 
favor ethnic diaspora. 144 Here, again, the justification of the 
criterion derives from the justification of the end. Yet, a justified 
end should not lead to an automatic conclusion that the criterion 
is justified. The justification of the criterion stems from other 
sources as well. The use of racial criteria may have direct or 
indirect influence on other people. For example, favoring Jewish 
immigrants in Israel may be a justified end in light of Jewish 
history, nonetheless the justification of the criterion of Jewish 
141. For the French and British postcolonial policies. see JOPPKE. supra note 5. at 
93-111. 144-56. 
142. !d. 
143. For a detailed review. see Y AKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN. supra note 85. at 126--33. 
144. See Asa Kasher. Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law of 
Refilm. 15 !SR. Y.B. HCM. RTS. 101 (1985). 
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descent is influenced by other factors. Chaim Gans explains that 
ethnic preferences in immigration selection in Israel are not 
morally wrong as long as they do not cause injustice to other 
ethnic group residing in Israel."' This view distinguishes between 
criteria and ends. Still, one may challenge these arguments: the 
Israeli Law of Return- and, to a certain extent, the German 
preferential policy toward ethnic German repatriates from 
Eastern Europe- is not a classic case of corrective justice. 
Neither Israel nor Germany can compensate for wrongs done by 
another party. Yet corrective justice theories indicate that 
immigration criteria can often depart from the past. As past 
wrongs are often collective in nature and were aimed against 
specific ethnic groups, immigration criteria may reflect such 
criteria as well. 
A long time has passed since the Chinese Exclusion Case 
yet racial classifications are still with us, not just as a matter of 
policy but also as good law. True, there are more barriers and 
strict conditions to fulfill, but, as a general rule, racial 
immigration criteria have not yet been excluded per se. The key 
question is whether this law can be justified. This question is 
complex. The conclusion surely depends on the justification the 
criteria serve. Unlike other scholars, we do not offer a 'black-
and-white' answer of clearly permissible and clearly 
impermissible criteria. 146 Rather, we offer a context-based 
approach. 
IV. RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY: 
ARE THEY COST EFFECTIVE? 
This Part discusses the use of racial immigration criteria in a 
specific context as a case study. It challenges the use of race, 
ethnicity and religion in the process of immigrant selection and 
in the context of the U.S. War on Terror. The discussion is 
limited to that context. The argument is based on utilitarian 
grounds. It is neither because other grounds do not support our 
case nor because they are less important or weaker, but merely 
because the strongest justification for the use of racial 
classifications in this context has been based on utilitarian 
145. See CHA!M GANS. THE LIMITS OF NATIO]';ALISM 138-39 (2003). Gans, however. 
supports ethnic-based inclusion (and exclusion) mainly under a concept of what he calls 
"sub-state's self-determination ... 
146. See Carens. supra note 11. at 104--05 (race. religion and ethnicity are always 
impermissible criteria). 
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grounds. Although effectiveness is not the only or the most 
important factor in the legal analysis, it is surely a preliminary 
one. The use of race is premised on its being an effective method 
to serve a legitimate end, such as protecting public safety. If this 
proposition is false, than the justification for using the criterion 
becomes weaker. This Part argues that racial immigration 
selection often lacks statistical validity, is not cost effective, and 
is likely to be over-inclusive and far in excess of its potential 
contribution due to cognitive biases and heuristic judgments. 
A. STATISTICAL CORRELATION 
In a recent article, Professor Legomsky asserts that any 
race-based immigration use must meet two requirements: 
rationality and justifiability. 147 Legomsky argues that the relevant 
inquiry under the rationality requirement should not be what 
percentage of the targeted group are terrorists. Rather, it should 
be what percentage of the terrorists are members of the targeted 
group. 148 If the percentage is higher compared to other groups-
it is less clear how higher it must be-the policy is rational due to 
its correlation between the traits and terrorism. 149 
Legomsky makes a policy argument yet rationality is a legal 
requirement as well. Under international human rights law, 
racial discrimination occurs whenever racial immigration criteria 
do not serve a legitimate aim, or are not proportional to the 
achievement of this aim- that is, among others, do not rationally 
serve the aim. 150 In U.S. constitutional law, at least two 
perspectives exist. On the one hand, if one believes that the 
Executive Branch should have plenary power when it comes to 
immigration, especially in admission cases where the 
Constitution generally does not apply abroad, one may conclude 
that no correlation is needed. On the other hand, if one believes 
that the Executive owes some obligations in the field of 
immigration-if not to immigrants, at least to citizens whose 
interests may be harmed in cases of immigration restrictions-
then one may conclude that some correlation is needed. As 
positive law, there is a circuit split on the required degree of 
147. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 177-79. 
148. !d. at 180-81. 
149. !d. 
150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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correlation: Some courts have applied a rational basis test while 
others asked for intermediate scrutiny. 1' 1 
Does a correlation between racial traits and terrorism exist? 
The government's strongest case for using racial classifications in 
immigration policy is premised on efficiency. However, a closer 
look reveals some empirically false propositions. On the 
statistical level, proving a statistical correlation between racial 
criteria and certain crimes is far from simple. When the U.S. 
government issued the NSEERS registration rules, the 
justification was the alleged statistical relationship between 
certain criteria and terrorism (the hijackers were all Muslim 
Arab men from the Middle East). Harvard Law Professor Alan 
Dershowitz stated that it would be foolish to fight against 
terrorism "by devoting equal attention to interrogating an 
eighty-year-old Christian woman from Maine and a twenty-two-
year-old Muslim man from Saudi Arabia." 152 Dershowitz's 
argument is based upon the assumption that terrorists are more 
likely to be found in specific groups sharing similar 
characteristics. However, in order not to be spurious, the 
assumption requires more than just showing that all the hijackers 
shared certain characteristics. One needs to present a statistical 
relevance between these characteristics and terrorism. 
In many of the cases discussed in this Article, it is doubtful 
whether the U.S. government was able to justify its policies on 
statistical grounds. The profile was at least over-inclusive. For 
example, the NSEERS scheme listed twenty-four Muslim-
majority countries with no correlation between the nationality of 
each of the listed nationalities- Algerian, Eritrean, Jordanian, 
etc.-and the propensity to engage in terrorism. It is also unclear 
whether the government's contention was to demonstrate a 
correlation between terrorism and certain nationalities, or 
between terrorism and a specific religion-with nationality only 
used as a pretext. To judge from the list of the designated 
countries, the focus was one's religion. Excluding North Korea, 
the list included twenty-four predominantly Muslim countries. 
Yet, the fact the list excluded other predominantly Muslim 
countries-the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
enumerates fifty-seven member states-may indicate that the 
151. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
152. See Ken Gewertz. Balancing Act: Civil Liberties and Security, HARV. GAZETTE 
NEWS. Dec. 13. 2001. 
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targeted group was a mix-and-match of religion and nationality. 
It pretended to be a quasi-scientific list of high-risk groups. But 
the claim that specific groups are more likely to become 
terrorists is an empirical proposition that requires establishing a 
correlation between the criteria and terrorism at a level that 
justifies inadmissibility. 
If history teaches anything about race-based statistics, it is a 
duty to be skeptical of their credibility. One example from a long 
list is the "list of races and peoples," issued by the U.S. 
Government on July 1, 1898. The story of the list is described by 
Patrick Weil. 153 The list divided immigrants into forty-two races, 
organized by five categories: Teutonic division from Northern 
Europe, Celtic division from Western Europe, Iberic division 
from Southern Europe, Slavic division from Eastern Europe, 
and Mongolic division. Its aim was to determine the capacity of 
different racial groups to integrate into the American society. 
All immigrants had to indicate their race and nationality and 
these factors served to decide their eligibility. The list was finally 
proven to be statistically erroneous,154 but it is one illustration of 
a long history of hysteria and panic directed at some immigrant 
groups (Chinese, Germans, Irish, etc.), which proved to be 
fallacious, though these groups were initially seen by some to 
represent a threat. 
The question of correlation between racial immigration 
criteria and terrorism is context-based. In the 1970s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the use of ''Mexican appearance" in 
immigration enforcement along the Mexican border. To support 
its conclusion, the Court referred to the statistic according to 
which "85% of the aliens illegally in the country are from 
Mexico."155 This percentage was doubtful even in the 1970s (it is 
surely doubtful today),156 but the question is what correlation the 
Court was trying to prove: was it between "Mexican 
appearance" and being an "illegal alien"? Was "Mexican 
appearance" an indicator of being a "Mexican national"? How 
153. Weil, supra note 41, at 627-38. 
154. I d. at 647-48. The list was completely abandoned in 1952. !d. at 638. 
155. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975). More accurately. the 
Court's conclusion was a combination of a general and a specific correlation. The Court 
found a general correlation. regardless of the circumstances. between "Mexican 
appearance" and being an "illegal alien." But it also referred to a circumstantial 
correlation because the person was stopped "near to the Mexican border." ld. at 873. 
877. 
156. Johnson, supra note 116. at 694-95. 
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much correlation is required to establish a statistical relationship 
between religion and terrorism in an immigration context? 
These questions remain open though they are crucial to the legal 
analysis. 
The use of appearance as a criterion in immigration 
enforcement requires a double correlation. In a recent case, 
involved ethnic profiling at JFK airport, the government 
asserted that "Middle Eastern appearance" is a relevant factor in 
a probable cause calculus because "all of the persons who 
participated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks were Middle Eastern 
males. "157 This reasoning requires proving a correlation between 
"Middle Eastern appearance" and being an Arab or a Muslim, 
and between the latter and terrorism. It may even require a 
triple correlation since the term "Middle Eastern appearance" is 
vague and law enforcement officials often use other criteria-
such as language, accent or dress code-to identify one's 
appearance. In the realm of likelihoods and probabilities, agents 
are not always familiar with the nuances of different religions 
and sects, and there is an inherent tendency toward confusion. 
Proving such correlation is not an easy task. As the Court held in 
this decision: "no court has ever marshaled statistics to conclude 
that racial or ethnic appearance is correlated with, and thus 
prob_ativ~ of,_ an_y t~g,; of cri_min_al condu~t other_ than 
ImmigratiOn vwlatwns. · In phrasmg Its conclusiOn by usmg the 
exception of "other than immigration violations," the Court 
asked to isolate immigration from other fields. However, even 
the Brignoni-Ponce case about Mexican appearance is context-
based and not a carte-blanche invitation to use racial criteria. 
At minimum,_ as Professor Le_goms~l noted,_ th~ required 
degree of correlatiOn has to be ratiOnal. · The pomt IS not that 
it is entirely irrational to employ racial immigration 
classification, but rather that the picture is more complex than 
seen at first glance. We lack sufficient evidence to provide 
157. See Farag v. United States. 587 F. Supp. 2d. 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
158. /d.; see also A1-ery. 137 F.3d 343.354 (""[A]lthough the Court in Brignoni-Ponce 
stated 'the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high 
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor." we refuse to adopt. by analogy. 
the concept that 'the likelihood that any given person of African ancestry is involved in 
drug trafficking is high enough to make African ancestry a relevant fact' in investigating 
drug trafficking.··). 
159. The test of rationality may apply differently to different immigration contexts. 
The level of rationality might be stricter. for example. in cases of removal compared to 
admission. 
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clear-cut conclusions, but from the available data it is at least 
possible to question whether such a correlation exists. 1611 
Furthermore, just because two things are correlated, does not 
mean that one causes the other. A correlation simply means 
that a relationship exists between two factors, but tells us 
nothing about the direction of this relationship. For instance. 
one may find that the 9/11 hijackers were all thin: Will someone 
seriously consider taking immigrants' weight into account in 
targeting future terrorists based on statistical correlation 
between weight and terrorism? 
B. COST EFFECTIVENESS 
A statistical relation, in itself, does not indicate that using 
certain criteria is also effective. To be cost effective. the overall 
benefits of the criteria should outweigh their overall costs. On 
the benefit side, one needs to prove that race effectively serves a 
legitimate interest to a degree that justifies its use. What must be 
assessed is not the efficiency of the system as a whole, but the 
incremental benefit derived from the additional use of race to the 
process of immigration selection. On the cost side, using racial 
criteria may yield some costs: human rights violations along with 
social costs, such as stigmatization of racial groups and creating 
hostility. 161 Imposing costs on certain groups may be seen as 
stigmatization of citizens who belong to such groups. 1"c What 
must be assessed, again, is the incremental cost derived from the 
use of race in immigrant selection. 163 As Legomsky noted in 
referring to the second requirement of justifiability, any gain in 
law enforcement efficiency have to be balanced against the 
serious harms inherent in government-sponsored 
160. See. e.g .. Leti Volpp. The Citizen and the Terrorist. 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 
(2002). 
161. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETIE N. KAYYEM. PROTECTING LIBERTY l"i 
AN AGE OF TERROR 106-07 (2005) (the costs of nationality profiling "will keep members 
of families apart ... individuals [and] employers may mimic what the government is 
doing. justifying their own profiles based on the lessons of government conduct. even if 
the government's profiling is limited in scope and context ... it will engender serious rifts 
between persons who could provide helpful information ... [it] may have serious 
consequences for our relations abroad . . . [it] would be both unfair and likely 
unhelpful."). 
162. See Johnson. supra note 122. at 1150-53: Legomsky. supra note 43. at 183: 
Motomura. supra note 122. at 1572-73: Rosberg. supra note 122. at 326-27: Volpp. supra 
note 160, at 1592-98. 
163. See Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser. Racial Profiling. 32 PHIL. & PL'B. 
AFF. 131 (2004). 
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discrimination. 104 It does not mean that cost effectiveness ts 
sufficient in order to justify the policy, only that it is a 
preliminary requirement. 
Making a cost-benefit analysis of using immigration criteria 
is a lofty goal and, without reliable data, an almost impossible 
task. It is hard to gauge how effective the NSEERS registration 
rules were, or to assess their costs. Are racial criteria a 
preemptive means, aimed at maximizing 'hit rates' of putative 
terrorists, or deterrence-based? We have no data on both 
aspects, but it is worth mentioning that the NSEERS regulations 
yielded not even one arrest from among thousands of targeted 
persons. 16' In addition, one needs to take into account the 
displacement effect. Terrorists often change methods and 
techniques and accommodate changes in immigration policies. 
They may declare a different religion, or use a different passport, 
or recruit non-profiled group members. Timothy McVeigh, who 
bombed the building in Oklahoma City, was a Catholic 
American. John Walker Lindh, Eric Rudolph, Jose Padilla-
were all Americans. Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," was 
British. Moreover, targeting only specific groups may even be 
counterproductive. To learn from a different case, the U.S. 
Customs Service published a study that compares the results of 
searches at airports using a group-based method to the results of 
searches at the same airports using a random method. The study 
reveals that conducting a random search yields a substantially 
higher "hit rate. " 166 Although African American women were 
more frequently searched, they were by far less likely than white 
American women or men to carry contraband. 
The questions needed to be asked are how effective is the 
use of the criterion, and for what price. The state must balance 
potential benefit with cost as a preliminary legal requirement, 
though it may be reasonable to require a different level of 
efficiency for different immigration contexts and regarding 
different infringed rights and trade-offs. 167 Yet in the empirical 
debate, it is not only hard to find reliable data to evaluate the 
164. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 178. 
165. Similarly. the German Rasterfahndung yielded not even one arrest from among 
300.000 targeted people. See Kett-Straub. supra note 76. at 971. 
166. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Customs Service: Better Targeting of 
Airline Passengers for Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results (2000). 
167. See Nelson. 472 U.S. 846. 881 ('"That the Executive might properly admit into 
this country many Cubans but relatively few Haitians does not imply that. when dealing 
with aliens in detention. it can feed Cubans but not feed Haitians.""). 
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right trade-off, but even based on the same data it is possible to 
reach different empirical conclusions. 
C. HEURISTIC JUDGMENT 
A third issue stems from the psychological human tendency 
to use racial criteria beyond what their actual predictive 
contribution justifies. Amos Tversky and Nobel Prize winner 
Daniel Kahneman present three cognitive biases that stem from 
the phenomenon of heuristic judgment: representativeness 
heuristic, availability heuristic, and adjustment heuristic. 10/l The 
first bias describes situations in which people assume that 
individual A belongs to group B by assessing similarity between 
A to B based on how closely they resemble each other. The 
judgment is often based on stereotypes that ignore what the 
authors call "base-rate frequency," or "prior probability." 169 For 
instance, a description according to which "Steve is very shy and 
withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in people" 
leads some to believe that Steve is a librarian and not a 
salesman, a pilot or a farmer. The description of Steve fits the 
stereotype of librarians more than the other occupations; people 
use the "most-likely-strategy" to attach A (Steve) to group B 
(librarians). This conclusion, however, is a statistical error. It 
ignores the prior probability under which there are more 
salesmen, farmers and pilots than librarians in the population 
and, hence, it is statistically more likely that Steve is not a 
librarian. 170 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, U.S. Attorney General John 
Ashcroft ordered questioning 5,000 Muslim Middle Eastern 
young men who legally resided in the United States. Ashcroft 
explained the policy by noting that this group is likely to be 
thinking about committing a crime. 171 When one incorporates 
base-rate frequency, this observation can be seen differently. 
Even if eighty percent of terrorism was committed by members 
of group Z, the likelihood that a member of group Z is a terrorist 
168. See Amos Tverskv & Daniel Kahneman. Judgment Under Uncertainly: 
Heuristics and Biases. in JUD.GMENT UNDER UNCERTAINLY: HEL"RISTICS AND BIASES 3 
(Daniel Kahneman. et al. eds .. 1982). Tversky and Kahneman show how judgment of 
probability leads to errors since it ignores considerations of base-rate frequency that 
must influence the outcome. 
169. /d. at 4-11. 
170. /d. 
171. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to all United States 
Attorneys and all Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9. 2001 ). 
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should consider group Z's percentage of the population and the 
percentage of terrorists among the population. If group Z 
constitutes 5 percent of the population, and terrorists constitute 
0.1 percent of the population, the likelihood that a member 
among group Z would be a terrorist is 0.8 x 0.00110.05 ( =0.016). 
This probability is higher than the probability that a non-
member of group Z is a terrorist, which in our example is 
0.001-some would say significantly higher because it is sixteen 
times more likely to be a terrorist-but is still a very small 
percentage. Therefore, the Attorney General's conclusion was 
wrong as long as it indicated that Muslim Middle Eastern men 
are likely to become involved in terror, but right as long as it 
indicated that a member of this group is more likely than a non-
group member to become involved in terror. 
In a recent article, Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckauser 
present an interesting view of how people psychologically 
evaluate risks. Viscusi and Zeckauser surveyed students at 
Harvard Law School, Harvard Kennedy School of Government 
and Wharton Business School on their risk beliefs. 172 One of the 
findings indicates that risk assessment is far from being an 
objective process. People (even educated students) are prone to 
evaluate risks less on probabilities and more based on personal 
preferences and subjective perceptions. They tend to put the 
focus on the "severity of the outcome than on the probability 
that it will occur." 173 People tend to think on the catastrophic 
result of a mistake rather than on its probability. Viscusi and 
Zeckauser referred to another important point: the 
psychological interweaving of values and probabilities. ''Values 
and probability assessments are often linked" and, hence, "those 
who think caRital punishment is immoral also tend to think of it 
ineffective."1 4 They concluded that in risk assessments people 
often rely on biases and irrational judgments that eventually 
might cause empirical errors. 
Even before analyzing legal and moral issues involved, it is 
possible to challenge some race-based immigration criteria on 
utilitarian grounds. This Part demonstrates that what might seem 
to be a cost-effective policy is not necessarily so in the context of 
the War on Terror because the use of race tends to be over-
172. See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckauser. Recollection Bias and the Combat 
of Terrorism. 34 J. LEG. STUD. 27 (2005). 
173. !d. at 47. 
174. /d. 
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inclusive, disregards costs, and involves psychological biases. The 
question that we will briefly discuss in the next section is 
whether other alternative methods for immigrant selection exist. 
We present four such methods: universal selection, positive 
selection, random selection and racial selection with just 
compensation. 
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF IMMIGRANT 
SELECTION 
As a policy matter, as Part II shows, the power of Congress 
and the Executive to decide whom to admit, and under which 
terms, has largely remained plenary. In certain circumstances, as 
Part III demonstrates, racial immigration classifications may be 
legally permitted under different perspectives. Yet. as Part IV 
presents, there are some utilitarian grounds to challenge this 
reality in the context of the U.S. War on Terror. Part V focuses 
now on alternative methods. It presents four alternatives of how 
to select immigrants. The purpose is not to make a case for one 
of them but rather to stimulate a debate on other methods of 
immigrant selection. Part V also shows why, in spite of some 
salient differences, none of these methods is racially-neutral. 
A. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION SELECTION 
It is possible to distinguish between four cases of immigrant 
selection. The first case occurs when an immigration policy seeks 
to achieve a racial purpose by using racial criteria. 17' An example 
is the Chinese Exclusion Act aimed at excluding Chinese by 
using Chinese descent as a criterion. 17" Another example is the 
National Origin Quota System. which governed U.S. 
immigration law from 1921 to 1965, whose purpose was, inter 
alia, to maintain the ethnic status quo of the U.S. population by 
using nationality-based criteria. In a way, one can consider the 
ethnic immigration preferences under German and Israeli law as 
fall within this category, as long as the purpose is keeping 
Germany for "Germans" and preserving Israel as a Jewish state. 
175. The term ··race·· is used in this Part as an umbrella category to describe race. 
ethnicitv and religion. 
176. · A note of limitation: One might claim that Chinese exclusion was not aimed at 
achieving a racial purpose but a non-racial purpose of better integration: . racial 
hegemony was only a means to an end. such as promoting the social cohesion. Th1s Part 
does not deal with historical aspects of such cla1ms. or w1th the1r normatlve aspects that 
relate stable societies to racial hegemony. 
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The second case occurs when an immigration policy seeks to 
achieve a racial purpose by using some facially-neutral criteria. 
States may use non-racial criteria- such as culture, skills, 
education or income-in order to exclude certain nationals. 
Because nationality is sometimes tied with race177 -exclusion of 
Chinese citizens is also exclusion of Asians; excluding Israelis 
may result in excluding some Palestinians. but the vast majority 
of people excluded will be Jews- the outcome may have racial 
implications. 17" In this case, non-racial criteria are strategically 
designed to achieve a racial purpose, though they may also end 
up with the exclusion of other groups who share similar 
characteristic. Thus, states might be willing to "lose" inclusion of 
some groups in order to "gain'' exclusion of some other groups. 
The third case occurs when an immigration policy seeks to 
achieve a non-racial purpose by using racial criteria. An example 
is when states impose nationality-based restrictions during war. 
The criterion of nationality here is not driven by, or aimed at, a 
racial purpose, but rather is intended to achieve a non-racial 
purpose of protecting national security. The assumption here is 
that there is a connection between enmity and nationality. 
Another example is temporal exclusion of Asian citizens due to 
fear of SARS. The goal here is protecting the public health, not 
excluding Asians. As Stephen Macedo asserts, immigration rules 
that used racial criteria. did not always ask to achieve a racial 
purpose; for example, ''while the animus against Irish Catholics 
was indeed based partly on race prejudice, there were more 
substantial and honorable grounds for worrying that the 
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church before Vatican II were 
inconsistent with liberalism." 179 
177. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji. 481 U.S. 604. 613-14 (1987) (Brennan. 
J.. concurring) ("The line between discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic 
characteristics ... and discrimination based on ·place or nation of [origin( ... is not a 
bright one ... often. however. the two are identical as a factual matter: one was born in 
the nation whose primary stock is one's own ethnic group."). 
178. A report released by Yale Law School found that although the DHS had used 
nationality as a criterion. seventy-nine percent of the foreign nationals investigated came 
from Muslim-majority countries. Citizens from Muslim-majority countries were in fact 
1.280 times more likely to be targeted than other nationals. See Eric Lichtblau. Inquiry 
Targeted 2,000 Foreign Muslims in 2004. N.Y. TiMES. Oct. 30. 2008. 
179. See STEPHEi\ MACEDO. DIVERSITY Ai\D DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCAT!Oi\ IT\ 
MLLTICL'LTCRAL DEMOCRACY 130 (2000). Macedo asserts that "it would be wrong to 
attribute the civic anxieties of this period to racism alone ... there were also civic. secular 
reasons for fearing that an education in orthodox Catholicism could be hostile to 
republican attitudes and aspirations ... /d. at 63. 
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The fourth case occurs when an immigration policy seeks to 
achieve a non-racial purpose by using facially-neutral criteria. 
States may use criteria such as education or income or skills for 
civic purposes, such as increasing economic efficiency. The 
policy here is intended to serve some facially-neutral national 
interests. 
The challenge in this typology is to separate the legitimate 
from the illegitimate immigration policies. At first glance, one 
might think that it is generally illegitimate to use racial criteria to 
achieve a racial purpose, and that it is generally legitimate to use 
facially-neutral criteria to achieve a non-racial purpose. As Part 
III shows, this is not always the case. The question of legitimate 
and illegitimate criteria depends on the perspective, the context, 
and the purpose it serves. On the one hand, there are cases in 
which ethnic preferences in immigration inclusion may be 
considered as a legitimate policy, even if they serve, to some 
extent, an ethnic purpose. On the other hand, facially-neutral 
criteria that are employed to achieve a non-racial purpose may 
have racial disparate impact that can violate human rights. At 
the end, the justification of the criteria derives, first and 
foremost, from the justification of the end they intended to 
serve. 
Two possible tests exist to distinguish between legitimate 
and illegitimate criteria. The first test focuses on motivation. A 
policy that is racially-motivated (whatever the procedure to 
explore motivation is) would be generally considered as 
illegitimate, whereas a policy that has non-racial motivation 
would be generally considered as legitimate. This is the test of 
intentional discrimination. As articulated by Justice Scalia: ''No 
matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the 
explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not 
implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race. 
That is the distinction between disproportionate effect, which is 
not sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation, and 
intentional discrimination. which is. "1"" 
The second test focuses on impact. A policy that has a 
racially disparate impact on a state's members (or, under a 
cosmopolitan view, on any group) would be generally considered 
illegitimate. whereas a policy that does not have 
disproportionate racial effect would be generally considered 
JRO. See Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352.377 (1991) (Scalia J.. concurring). 
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legitimate. This test was implemented by the British House of 
Lords and the Israeli Supreme Court. 1H1 It is also a well-
established test under international human rights law. which 
distinguishes between direct racial discrimination- that is, 
differential treatment based on racial criteria- to indirect racial 
discrimination- differential treatment based on non-racial 
criteria that puts some racial groups at a disadvantage compared 
to other groups. 1K2 To be clear. differentiation does not mean 
discrimination let alone unlawful discrimination. The criterion 
might be seen as illegitimate because of racial motivation or 
racial effect, but can still be lawful due to other legitimate 
interests involved. 
In the next sections, we analyze four methods of how to 
select immigrants- universal selection, positive selection, 
random selection and racial selection with just compensation -in 
light of the above two tests distinguishing between legitimate 
and illegitimate immigration criteria. 
B. UNIVERSAL SELECTION 
A first option is to select immigrants based on "'universal" 
criteria, i.e., criteria that do not directly discriminate on the basis 
of race. These may be ascribed characteristics, such as one's 
gender, or achieved characteristics, such as one's education, 
occupation or wealth. Almost every liberal democracy has such a 
system. The United States, for example, gives priorities to family 
immigrants over other immigrants and to immediate relatives 
over other family members. These preferences rely on the 
importance of family unity. Similarly, there are preferences in 
employment visas according to one's occupation, age, skills or 
investment. 183 These criteria are aimed at achieving a non-racial 
purpose closely related to the labor market. 
181. See Regina. UKHL 55 at para 75: HCJ 7052/03. supra note 59. 
182. See, e.g .. Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost [1974] E.C.R. 153 at 
para 11 ("The rules regarding equality of treatment ... forbid not only overt 
discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which. 
by the application of other criteria of differentiation. lead in fact to the same result."): 
Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment [1997] E.C.R. at para 51 ("The existence of 
statistically significant evidence is enough to establish disproportionate impact and pass 
the onus to the author of the allegedly discriminatory measure."): Case of D.H. and 
Others v. the Czech Republic [2007] E.C.R. at para 175. 183 ("A general policy or 
measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be 
considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that 
group."). 
183. See §201(b) of the INA (for preferences of family-sponsored immigrants). 
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Another example is the points-based system. The system, 
which Congress considered adopting in the 2007 failed 
immigration reform, 1k4 has recently been adopted in Britain. The 
system is an attempt to make the process of selecting immigrants 
quasi-mathematical. It divides immigrants into five tiers: Tier I 
focuses on highly-skilled workers; Tier II focuses on skilled 
workers with a job offer; Tier III focuses on temporary low-
skilled workers; Tier IV focuses on students; and Tier V focuses 
on temporary workers needed to satisfy non-economic goals. 185 
Each tier has different conditions and entitlements. 1K6 One's 
classification is determined by the points one scores. For 
instance, in order to be part of Tier I for highly-skilled workers. 
the applicant must score at least ninety-five points in total. The 
points are distributed based on non-racial criteria: age, previous 
earnings, experience in Britain, language proficiency and funds. 
This distribution has its own preferences. Take age: the system 
clearly prefers young applicants. A person under twenty-eight 
years of old will earn twenty points. while a person over thirty 
will only earn five points. The system also prefers educated 
people: an applicant will score fifty points for holding a Ph.D .. 
thirty-five points for a master degree and thirty points for a 
bachelor degree. 
Universal criteria appear in our typology in cases two and 
four: using facially-neutral criteria to achieve a racial purpose. 
and using facially-neutral criteria to achieve a non-racial 
purpose. One way to judge the legitimacy of universal criteria is 
to implement the test of policy motivation. Take the criterion of 
age. Several European states have recently fixed a minimum age 
for marriage migration. In Denmark, marriage migration is only 
possible if both parties are above twenty-four years of age. One 
motivation for the policy can be protecting young adults from 
forced and arranged marriages. The assumption is that people 
below a certain age have less capacity to resist an arranged 
marriage. A second motivation can be related to the immigration 
scale, that is, age is just another criterion used in the general 
enterprise to limit migration. In this context, states may come to 
§201(d) (for preferences of employment-based immigrants). 
184. See Draft Secure Borders. Economic Opportunity. and Immigration Reform 
Act of 2007. 
185. For details. see http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/. 
186. Tiers 3 and 5. e.g., are temporary. Immigrants in these tiers cannot switch out 
once they are in the UK. 
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the conclusion that raising the age of marriage migration can 
reduce the number of immigrants. But there might be a third 
motivation. It is possible that states do not want a certain kind of 
immigrants and age is just a pretext to exclude them. One could 
argue that Danish citizens of Muslim origin tend to marry at a 
younger age than non-Muslim Danes and, therefore, outlawing 
marriage migration below twenty-four years of age may end up 
excluding a high percentage of Muslim immigrants, even if non-
Muslim immigrants will also pay the price of such a policy. 187 
Another way to judge the legitimacy of universal criteria is 
to implement the test of disparate impact. This test does not 
explore intent but effect. If the burden of using a specific 
criterion falls on a certain racial group, then the criterion may be 
regarded as illegitimate even if it is not-racially motivated. One 
problem with applying this test to the context of universal 
criteria is that it is hard to find criteria that have no racial 
implications. Criteria such as "education" and "income" give 
preferences to people from developed countries-the same with 
"merits," "qualifications" and "skills." Even height and weight 
are not universaL as Koreans are shorter on average than 
Swedes, and Euroyeans weigh more on average than sub-
Saharan Africans. 1 Applying a disparate impact test to the 
Danish example can lead to the conclusion that age is an 
illegitimate criterion as long as it leads to a racially disparate 
impact. Unlike the policy motivation test, age may still be an 
illegitimate criterion even if its motivation is racially-neutral. 
C. POSITIVE SELECTION 
A second option is positive selection. This method is 
designed to identify immigrants who are most likely to 
contribute to the national interests. It is premised on the same 
rationale of universal selection with two differences. The first 
difference is that while universal selection does not contain 
racial criteria, positive selection does permit taking them into 
account. Race can be one among other factors, such as skills 
187. See Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles. Commissioner for Human Rights. on his 
Visit to Denmark. Council of Europe 8. 22 (2004). 
188. For selected data of heights and weights by countries. see the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the U.N. at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/004/M2846E/ 
M2846E07.htm. This is not just a theoretical issue. New Zealand has banned family 
migration when the foreign member fails a body mass index test. The presumption is that 
overweight immigrants might become a burden on the health care services. See Aida 
Edemariam. Are You too Fat to Emigrate?. THE GUARDIAN. Nov. 20.2007. 
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training or work experience, to score points. Race will not be the 
sole factor to determine one's eligibility for admission, but can 
be one among other factors. 
Positive selection appears in our typology in cases one and 
three: using racial criteria to achieve a racial purpose, and using 
racial criteria to achieve a non-racial purpose. The use of racial 
criteria to achieve a racial purpose occurs, for instance, when an 
immigrant of German ancestry gets more points in Germany, 
and a Jewish immigrant gets more points in Israel, as long as the 
purpose of the preferences is preserving racial hegemony (if the 
preferences have a non-racial purpose, the classification falls 
under case three). While race serves in these situations as a 
factor giving fast-track admission to ethnic diaspora, it can also 
serve as a kind of "affirmative action." The state can decide that 
a specific racial group is underrepresented in its immigration 
system, such as the case of African immigrants in the United 
States.189 It can further decide that being an African would give 
the applicant more points. In this case, although the applicant 
may not have the required level of education or wealth, she may 
still be able to reach the total required points by using her 
African descent. 
A second difference between positive and universal 
selection is that positive selection does not include criteria for 
inadmissibility. In a typical points-based system, the applicant is 
admissible when she earns the required points unless some 
grounds for inadmissibly exist, such as health, criminal or 
security-related grounds. Positive selection includes no 
exclusionary criteria. Everyone is admissible-even people with 
criminal record, student visa abusers, etc.-as long as the 
applicant earns the total scores required. The process is flexible 
and takes into account a wide range of factors. On the one hand, 
the applicant can gain points for family ties with citizens, skills 
and being a national of specific countries. On the other hand, the 
applicant can lose points because of a criminal conviction, or 
being a citizen of a less-favored country. Hence, one can lose 
points for having prior convictions, but earn points because of 
education, personal net worth, or a particular more-favored 
country. 
1R9. See infra notes 202-205 and accompanying text. 
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A similar system has recently been adopted in Britain as 
an upgrade to the recently-launched points-based system. 190 On 
August 2009, the Home Office announced that in addition to 
the points-based entry criteria, would-be citizens need to earn 
points to become British citizens. The novelty of the new plan 
is to extend the logic of points-based selection from 
immigration policy to citizenship law. It sets up three stages 
needed to become a British citizen: tem~orary residence, 
probationary citizenship, and citizenship. 91 The path to 
citizenship has been extended from five to ten years, yet 
applicants can shorten this period by becoming active members 
of political parties or trade unions, or performing socially-
beneficial volunteer work. Extra points are also granted for 
working in areas in-need of immigration, such as Scotland, and 
for fast integrating, e.g., by learning English. 192 The applicant, 
however, can lose points for "bad behavior." Points will be 
de~ucted f~r eng.aging in genera~ly-le1~1al ~ctivities . such as takmg part m antt-war demonstrations, - failures to mtegrate 
into the British way of life, anti-social behaviors, criminal 
activities or showing disregard for British values. The system is 
flexible; it raises or lowers the threshold for settlement 
according to Britain's changing circumstances. 
D. RANDOM SELECTION 
A third option is to select immigrants randomly. The United 
States has had a lottery selection in place in various versions 
since 1986. Each year some 55,000 persons are randomly 
190. See Citizenship Points Plan Launched. BBC, Aug. 3 2009; Richard Edwards, 
Immigrants Denied Citizenship for Demonstrating against British Troops, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 3. 2009: Alistair Macdonald, U.K. to Review and Tighten 
Requirements for Citizenship. WALL ST. 1.. Aug. 3. 2009: Alan Travis, New Migrants to 
Britain Face ·Points Test for Citizenship.' THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2009. 
191. See The Borders. Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, available at 
http://www .england-legislation.hmso.gov .uk/ acts/ acts2009/pdf/ukpga_20090011_en. pdf. 
For a detailed discussion. see Analysis of the Points Based System (August 
2009), available at http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/ 
workingwithus/mac/pbsanalysis-09/0809/mac-august-09?view=Binary. The Act 1s 
expected to go into effect in 2011. 
192. See Earning to Right to Stay. A New Points Test for Citizenship, Home Office: UK 
Border Agency (July 2009). available at http://www.hmg.gov.uk/buildingbritainsfuture/ 
immigration-citizenship.aspx. 
193. The ·anti-war demonstration· clause is bizarre because it reduces points for 
engaging in legally-permitted activities. See Richard Ford, Anti-War Migrants Could 
Damage Citizenship Hopes. THE TIMES. Aug. 4, 2009: James Slack, Immigrants Who Jeer 
at British Troops in the Street to be Barred from Gaining Citizenship, DAILY MAIL. Aug. 
3 2009. 
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selected for permanent residence by a computer-generated 
lottery selection. 194 The lottery's qualifications are having a high 
school diploma (or its equivalent) or having at least two years of 
work experience in an occupation requiring two years of training 
or experience, and having been born in a country that has a low 
admission rate in the previous five years. The visas are 
distributed among six regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North 
America (other than Mexico), Oceania and South America 
(including Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean ). 195 The 
stated objective of the lottery visas is to increase diversity. 1 ~" 
Lottery visas look neutral. Nevertheless, a closer look 
reveals a fiery debate on their motivation and impact. In an 
insightful article, Stephen Legomsky asserts that diversity lottery 
is "merely the latest in a series of congressional attempts, 
spanning more than a century, to influence the ethnic 
composition of the United States immigrant stream ... [it] is new 
in form, but not in spirit. "197 Critics of the lottery have two 
arguments in supporting this position. To begin with, historical 
evidence indicates a discriminatory purpose. The calls for the 
lottery were initiated by interest groups (principally Irish-
Americans) who sought to increase Irish and Western European 
immigration. 198 One unforeseen effect of the 1965 Immigration 
Act was to shift the ethnic composition of immigrants from 
Western Europe to those from Asia. Some of the architects of 
the 1965 legislation expected that Western Europeans would 
continue to predominate.199 However, the number of Western 
European immigrants significantly declined, while the number of 
194. See§§ 201(e). 203(c) of the INA. 
195. The visas are divided between high and low admission regions. with a higher 
number of visas allocated to low-admissions regions. and no visas allocated to states 
sending more than 50.000 immigrants in the previous five years. In addition. no state 
receives more than seven percent of the total number of visas. Winning the lottery does 
not guarantee a visa but merely establishes eligibility to receive a visa. 
196. See PETER H. SCHUCK. DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A 
SAFE DISTANCE 75-133 (2003). 
197. See Stephen H. Legomsky. Immigration, Equality and Diversity. 31 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT"L L. 319. 321, 326 (1993). 
198. See Anna 0. Law. The Diversity Visa Lottery: A Cycle of Unintended 
Consequences in United States Immigration Policy. 21 J. AM. ETHNIC HIS. 3 (2002). The 
original version of the diversity lottery, known as the Donnelly-Kennedy Lottery. 
reserved 40 percent of the visas for Irish nationals. The INA even grants Ireland a double 
status by saying that "only for purposes of administering the diversity program under this 
subsection. Northern Ireland shall be treated as a separate foreign state." See §203(c)(f) 
of the INA. 
199. ScHeCK. supra note 196. at 87. 
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Asian and Hispanic immigrants dramatically increased. The 
lottery system was intended to correct this reality.200 Next, some 
critics indicate that the congressional definition of a "region" has 
been strategically designed to benefit European countries. They 
argue that the region definitions adopted by Congress are not 
geographical but cultural. By grouping "Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean" to the South American region, 
Congress has limited the access to lottery visas from this 
• 2(Jl 
regiOn. 
Another debate surrounds the impact of lottery visas. The 
2008 data show that only two percent of diversity visas were 
allocated to South and Central Americans while nineteen 
percent were allocated to Europeans.202 Critics claim that this 
shows a disparate impact favoring Europeans. They argue that 
inasmuch as diversity is the goal justifying the lottery, the 
program has failed to achieve its goal. Legomsky states that the 
lottery program is "anti-diversity" because it "makes the 
resulting United States population less diverse-not more 
diverse- than it would otherwise be. "203 Even lottery 
proponents are critical of certain aspects of the program. Some 
procedures of the lottery seem, in their view, to have a negative 
impact against Africans. For example, the requirement of high 
school diploma is harder to fulfill in African states, as is the 
requirement to complete an application electronically, which 
requires internet access and an ability to manage a computer.204 
Random immigration selection has not taken away the 
controversy about racial selection. One explanation might be the 
claim that one's nationality still determines one's eligibility for 
participation in the lottery and one's chances of winning. What 
really is random are the individual names chosen among non-
random, or partially-random, collectives. This is why Legomsky 
terms lottery visas "geographic priorities," which randomly 
200. For the legislative history of the diversity lottery, see JOPPKE, supra note 5, at 
74-80: SCHUCK. supra note 196. at 87-94: Jonathan H. Wardle, Note: The Strategic Use of 
Mexico to Restrict South American Access to the Diversity Visa Lottery, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1963. 1974--83 (2005): Walter P. Jacob. Note: Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel 
Politics. 6 GEO. I~MIGR. L.J. 297 (1992). 
201. Wardle. supra note 200. at 1987. 
202. The other visas were allocated to Asian (38 percent) and African (41 percent). 
See Diversity Lottery Visa 2008 Results, available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/ 
immigrants/types/types_l317.html. 
203. Legomsky. supra note 197. at 334. 
204. /d. at 1069-70. 
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assign individuals but on the basis of their collective belonging. 
However, in testing motivation and impact, one needs to see the 
whole picture of immigrant selection. The other coin of the 
negative impact of lottery visas on Hispanic immigrants is their 
positive impact on African immigrants. Data show that the 
lottery program provides the only viable way for Africans 
seeking to immigrate to the United States who do not have pre-
existing family or business ties to qualify.205 The lottery positively 
affects a group that is still underrepresented in U.S. immigration 
law. Hence, lottery visas may not diversify the U.S. population, 
but it greatly diversifies the composition of immigrant 
population to the United States.206 The diversity lottery may have 
a disparate impact against Asians and Latinos, but taken as a 
whole, U.S. immigration law actually favors Asian and Latin 
Americans. 207 
The critique of lottery visas does not focus on the principle 
of random selection but on its being badly managed.208 What is 
not clear is whether the critique is about the lottery's criteria or 
purposes. The criteria used by the lottery are not really race-
based: a high school diploma, two years of work experience, 
etc.209 It is possible to cast doubt whether the criterion of 
"region" has been strategically designed to have nationality-
based or racial impact, but this argument focuses on the 
purposes and not on the criteria. It may be the case that diversity 
visas were somehow racially motivated, or have racial 
implication, but this is a different argument. It still allows 
205. See Bill 0. Hing, Messages of Exclusion ro African Americans. 37 How. L.J. 237 
(1994). 
206. /d. at 1064-(;5 ("'Overall. the diversity visa program has increased opportunities 
for African immigration to the United States by 64% between FY 1994 and FY 1997."): 
Andowah A. Newton, Note: Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy: The 
Diversity Visa Program and the Missing Discourse on its Impact on African Immigration 
to the United States. 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1049 (2005) ("'The diversity visa program 
presents an opportunity to reduce some of the effects of the past exclusion of Africans 
and to increase their representation in the U.S. immigrant population."). 
207. /d. Diversity visas constitute only six percent of the total immigrant visas and 
thus their impact on the immigration system is negligible. 
208. But see SCHUCK, supra note 196, at 128 ("A visa to the United States is the 
most valuable resource that mobile foreigners can ever hope to obtain ... no convincing 
conception of justice demands ... that this precious asset should simply be given away at 
random and without reference to any benefits for American society ... no other country 
allocates its valuable visas by lottery."). 
209. /d. at 127 ("'Although the system, like any complex practice. affects different 
states differently. the important point is that its disparate impacts result not from 
invidious discrimination but from the differential effects of the per-country ceilings. the 
timing of earlier migrations. their demographic mix. and other such factors.''). 
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classifying the lottery system, in our typology, in cases two and 
four: using facially-neutral criteria in order to achieve a racial 
purpose, or a non-racial purpose. 
E. RACIAL SELECTION WITH JUST COMPENSATION 
A fourth option is to sustain some forms of racial selection 
while compensating for the discriminatory effect. This is 
intended to ensure that states do not just racially discriminate, 
but do so based on just interests for which they are willing to 
pay. This idea requires an in depth discussion: Who will 
compensate and who will be compensated (is the compensation 
between nations, or between nations and individuals?), how will 
the compensation be distributed, what kind of compensation is 
appropriate, what is the compensation about, and why should 
states compensate for immigration decisions to begin with? We 
do not deal with these issues here but rather present three 
examples of this kind of reasoning from Europe, Israel and the 
United States. 
In recent years, some European governments have started 
to pay immigrants to leave. This development started in Spain 
and spread like a virus across Europe. The idea is simple: No 
immigrant is forced to leave, but there is a tempting incentive for 
voluntary departure. A person who chooses to leave and 
promises not to come back will be paid. The sums are not 
insubstantial: Sweden pays 30,000 kronor (about $4,000), 
Denmark 100,000 krone (about $20,000), France almost $8,000, 
and the Czech Republic just under $1,000. Spain is offering an 
amount equals to six months of benefits, which is about 
$18,500.210 The payment is not a compensation for inadmissibility 
or denying access to citizenship, but instead represents an 
indirect compensation for voluntary leaving. In some countries, a 
pilot program offers immigrants additional help in returning to 
their home countries, such as a payment of a few thousand 
210. See And Don't Come Back. THE ECONOMIST, July 2. 2009; Foreigners to Get 
100,000 Kroner Incentive to Leave Denmark. THE COPENHAGEN POST ONLINE, Nov. 9, 
2009: France to Pay Immigrants to Return Home. SPIEGEL ONLINE. May 24. 2007: Henry 
McDonald. Irish Gm·ernment to Pay Immigrants to Go Home. THE GUARDIAN. Nov. 15. 
2009: Christian Peregin. New Incentive to Help Immigrants Return Home. TiMES OF 
MALTA. Nov. 8. 2009: Joe lien Perry. The Czech Republic Pays for Immigrants to Go 
Home. WALL ST. 1.. Apr. 28. 2009: Spain: Immigrants Shun Plan to Take Money. Go 
Home. THE BOSTOS HERALD. Nov. 13. 2009: Spain to Pay Immigrants to Leave, THE 
GUARDIAN, July 21. 2008: Tom Whitehead, Foreign Prisoners Handed £500 Cash Cards 
to Go Home. THE TELEGRAPH. Dec. 22. 2009. 
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dollars to set up a business. Indeed, thousands of immigrants left 
Europe following a resettlement package to resettle in their 
home country.211 
The European policy uses non-racial criteria to encourage 
people to leave. Immigrants of all races are entitled to take the 
money and go away. What is unclear is the policy purpose. There 
can be many reasons for such policies; among others is the 
economic downturn, but also failures of integration. It may be 
cheaper to pay people to leave than to invest in their integration 
or provide them with unemployment benefits. But there might 
be another purpose. It is possible that some states seek by such 
payments to encourage immigrants who share a specific ethnic 
descent to leave. In that case, using the test of policy motivation. 
the practice may be illegitimate. A similar conclusion applies if 
the policy affects immigrants having certain ethnic origins. 
Suppose the United States uses non-racial criteria to 
achieve a non-racial purpose. The government can decide. for 
example, that one possible step to reduce the number of 
unauthorized immigrants is to pay them to leave. Assume that 
the policy is not motivated by xenophobia, but is intended to 
achieve a legitimate economic purpose. Under the test of 
intentional discrimination, such policy can be legitimate. even if 
it mainly impacts Mexican immigrants. One might ask: Will it be 
permissible to use a racial criterion to achieve a non-racial 
purpose? And what about using a non-racial criterion that 
intends to achieve a racial purpose? 
A version of this last idea was promoted by the Israeli right-
wing former Knesset Member Michael Kleiner. Kleiner 
presented a bill to "encourage people who do not identify with 
Israel as a Jewish State" to leave. The bill stated that "any 
resident or citizen who emigrates to an Arab country shall be 
entitled to a special payment. "212 The bill was a mix match of 
racial and non-racial criteria. In principle, every Israeli citizen 
could have participated in the program. However. the program 
only applied to citizens who were willing to leave to an Arab 
state, usually Israeli Arab citizens. Indeed, Kleiner's purpose 
was to encourage Palestinian citizens, whom he saw as a threat to 
Israel's right to self-determination, to leave the country. The bill 
211. See Lisa Abend, Spain Tries to Buy Out Immigrants. TiME. Oct. 20.2008. 
212 See Chaim Gans, Nationalist Priorities and Restrictions in Immigration: The 
Case of Zionist and Israel. 2 L. & ETHICS OF HCM. RTS. (2008). 
2010] IMMIGRATION SELECTION 295 
was thus a combination of racial and non-racial criteria, designed 
to achieve a racial purpose. Unlike the European practice, which 
applies to aliens, Kleiner's bill sought to encourage citizens to 
leave the country.213 Eventually, the bill was labeled as racist by 
the Speaker of the Knesset and has never been discussed. It 
combined racial motivations with a racial purpose by using a 
racial criterion. It was an illegitimate policy under the tests of 
policy motivation and policy impact. 
While the European and Israeli policies are a form of 
compensation between nations and individuals, another option 
can be having a mechanism of compensation between nations. 
States might decide to limit a certain kind of immigration by 
reaching a mutual agreement. For example, State X might 
enhance its border enforcement in return for some economic or 
other benefits from State Z. In this case, State Z provides 
"subsidies' for State X's actions. These arrangements can work 
on the opposite side: State Z might impose sanctions on State X 
for not cooperating over border infiltration. One example may 
be a recent bill promoted by Pennsylvania Senator Arlen 
Specter. The bill provides that the United States would impose 
sanctions on states that refuse to take back their illegal 
immigrants. 214 Among the suggested sanctions is denial of 
immigrant visa or denial of foreign aid. Spencer notes that some 
countries refuse to take back their citizens- illegal immigrants 
who are waiting for deportation. Giving some flexibility to 
diplomatic considerations, he suggests punishing countries that 
do not cooperate.21 ; 
This Part presents some alternative methods of selecting 
immigrants. None of them is completely race-blind, though some 
are less race-based. One lesson is that not every race-based 
policy is racist and xenophobic, the same as not every merits-
based system is to be celebrated as racially-neutral. The picture, 
as this Part presents, is much more complicated. 
CONCLUSION 
Some twenty-two years ago, Columbia Law Professor Louis 
Henkin indicated that even one hundred years after it was 
213. /d. 
214. See The Accountability in Immigrant Repatriation Act of 2008. HR 5761. 
215. See Eunice Moscoso. Bill Would Punish Nations that Reject Own Emigrants. 
Cox NEWS. May 4. 2008. 
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decided, the Chinese Exclusion Case was "still very much with 
us. "c
16 As long as the Chinese Exclusion Case is read to permit 
racial, religious, and nationality-based classifications, Henkin's 
observation is still valid today. To a surprisingly large extent, the 
power of Congress to regulate immigrant selection based on 
invidious distinctions continues to exist and, even more so, 
continues to be legally permitted to an extent not matched in 
any other avenue of American jurisprudence. 
Liberal democracies will continue in the foreseeable future 
to select immigrants into their societies. Borders will most 
probably be left neither completely closed nor completely 
open. The challenge is how to manage immigrant selection. This 
Article seeks to fill the gap in a theoretical question that has far-
reaching practical implications. 
216. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of 
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny. !00 HARV. L. REV. R53. 854 (19R7). 
